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TAKING REFORM FURTHER WITH INNOVATIONS IN
NOTICE, SITUS, AND REPRESENTATION
Karen E. Boxx * & Katie S. Groblewski **
Abstract: Washington trust laws were comprehensively revised in 2011 and 2013,
resulting in the integration of concepts from the Uniform Trust Code and the addition of
some novel provisions. This article discusses in depth the evolution of Washington law
regarding the duties to inform and report, the situs of a trust, and representation of interested
parties. In addition, this article discusses other UTC provisions that were integrated into
Washington statutes and gives an explanation of any departures from UTC language and
prior Washington law.
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INTRODUCTION
The Washington State legislature passed a sweeping update of the
Washington trust statutes in its 2011 legislative session (the “2011
Legislation”). 1 The 2011 Legislation was a product of a Washington
State Bar Association task force formed in 2003 (the “2003 Task Force”)
to evaluate the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), which was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
2000. 2 The 2003 Task Force 3 initially determined that instead of a
wholesale adoption of the UTC, it would develop and propose a bill that
incorporated aspects of the UTC but essentially preserve the structure
and substance of the existing Washington trust statutes. Washington
already had a well-developed statutory framework for trust law as a
result of major efforts by the state bar that resulted in legislation in 1984

1. S.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011).
2. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues,
67 MO. L. REV. 143, 144 (2002). The Uniform Trust Code was amended in 2004. All references to
the UTC in this Article shall include the UTC as adopted in 2000 and as was later amended.
3. The task force was formed by the WSBA Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section. Members
of the task force were: Alfred M. Falk, Ann T. Wilson, Frederick G. Emry, II, Ivan K. Landreth, Jr.,
Marcia K. Fujimoto, Michael D. Carrico, Thomas M. Culbertson, Watson B. Blair, W.C. Twig
Mills, and Karen E. Boxx, co-author of this Article, who served as task force chair.
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and 1999. 4 Some existing Washington law had even been used as
models for UTC provisions. 5 The 2003 Task Force wanted to retain the
groundbreaking innovations already part of Washington trust law while
recognizing that there were still gaps and room for improvement. The
resulting 2011 Legislation, which became law January 1, 2012, included
many provisions of the UTC as written, several UTC provisions that
were amended by the 2003 Task Force to better suit Washington trust
practice, and some provisions that addressed issues that were not
covered by the UTC but which the 2003 Task Force believed were
necessary. Implementation of the 2011 Legislation raised numerous
issues within the Washington practitioner community, and the Real
Property, Probate, and Trust section of the state bar formed another task
force (the “2012 Task Force”) to consider amendments to the 2011
Legislation. 6 The result of the second task force was Senate Bill 5344,
which was signed into law on May 16, 2013 and became effective July
28, 2013 (the “2013 Legislation”). 7
This Article first gives a brief description of the scope, purpose, and
history of the UTC and a brief summary of the status of Washington law
on trusts before 2011. It then covers in depth three significant aspects of
the Washington 2011 and 2013 Legislation: the trustee’s duty to keep
beneficiaries informed, determination of a trust’s situs, and
representation of beneficiaries by other beneficiaries or third parties.
First, the issue of required notice to beneficiaries has been one of the
most controversial aspects of the UTC, 8 and the new Washington
statutes have adopted those provisions with significant modifications.
Second, the UTC drafters declined to address the determination of situs
because of its complexity, 9 but the 2003 Task Force believed this was a
critical issue that needed resolution. Washington law now contains an
innovative provision that redefines situs for the era of cloud computing

4. S.B. 5196, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999); Substitute H.B 1213, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 1984).
5. For example, UTC section 1007 is based on RCW sections 11.100.140 and 11.98.100. U.T.C.
§ 1007 cmt (2010).
6. The members of the 2012 Task Force were Douglas C. Lawrence (as Committee Chair), Katie
S. Groblewski, Karen E. Boxx, Akane R. Suzuki, James A. Flaggert, Alfred M. Falk, and Janis A.
Cunningham.
7. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013).
8. See John Spencer Treu, The Mandatory Disclosure Provisions of the Uniform Trust Code: Still
Boldly Going Where No Jurisdiction Will Follow—A Practical Tax-Based Solution, 82 MISS. L. J.
597 (2013).
9. See English, supra note 2, at 156.
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and national corporate trustees. 10 Third, Washington provisions
regarding representation of interested parties by other parties with
interests in the trust needed updating. Since 1984, Washington has had a
broad virtual representation statute that is more expansive than common
law. Both the 2011 and 2013 Legislation substantially updated that
statute by retaining its expansion of the common law doctrine, by
including provisions of the UTC and by making the application of the
statute more streamlined for modern trusts and estates practice. After
discussion of the three most complex areas that were updated, this
Article gives a brief description of other UTC provisions that were
integrated into Washington statutes, such as a statutory duty of loyalty
and codification of cy pres, together with an explanation of any
departures from UTC language and prior Washington law.
Supplementing this Article are materials on the Washington Law
Review website, such as a summary of the UTC provisions that were not
adopted by either the 2011 or 2013 Legislation, together with a crossreference to existing and unmodified Washington statutes that cover the
issues in the omitted UTC sections.
I.

BACKGROUND ON WASHINGTON TRUST LAW AND THE
UTC

Trust law began in courts of equity 11 as far back as the fourteenth
century 12 and has been developed over centuries of judicial decisions, so
its source has primarily been case law rather than statutes. Because case
law often leaves gaps, the Uniform Law Commissioners set out to create
a comprehensive codification of trust law, in order “to update, fill out,
and systematize the American law of trusts.” 13 The result of this effort,
the UTC, has so far been enacted in twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia. 14 Other states are considering enactment, and some states,

10. See infra Part III.C.
11. John H. Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 1069, 1080 (2007).
12. Id. at 1071.
13. See English, supra note 2, at 144.
14. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, Legislative Fact Sheet—Trust Code,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Aug. 18,
2013).
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like Washington, have enacted some but not all of the provisions. 15 The
drafting of the UTC was coordinated with the drafting of the
Restatement (Third) of Trusts, so there is significant consistency
between the two. 16
While Washington trust law has a significant grounding in judicial
decisions, an increasing number of issues have been addressed by
statute. The Washington Trust Act of 1984 17 reorganized and expanded
the provisions of Revised Code of Washington (RCW) Title 11 dealing
with trusts. Those provisions were further revised and expanded in
1994, 18 1997, 19 1999 (the Trusts and Estates Dispute Resolution Act), 20
and 2002 (the Washington Principal and Income Act of 2002). 21 When
the 2003 Task Force was formed to review the UTC and consider its
adoption in Washington, the members agreed that Washington had
already made significant steps to codify and clarify trust law, and that
the case law and other experiences with existing statutes were important
resources that should be retained. The 2003 Task Force therefore
decided to retain most of Washington’s existing statutes and
organization, but also to review the UTC for sections that would fill gaps
in Washington law or improve existing Washington statutes. Where
possible, the 2003 Task Force retained the UTC language so that the
interpretation of that language by courts in the other states that had
adopted the UTC could be used as guidance. The 2003 Task Force
intended for the UTC comments to be used as a guide for interpretation,
to the extent they are consistent with Washington’s version of the UTC.
The 2012 Task Force followed the same principles when integrating
UTC language.
Much of the UTC is a codification of well-established common law
principles because that was a primary goal of the drafters. 22 However,
the 2003 Task Force believed that common law should remain the
primary source of Washington trust law and that codification of wellestablished principles was unnecessary. It therefore chose not to adopt
several sections of the UTC, even though there was no corresponding
15. See, e.g., Kara Blanco, Comment, The Best of Both Worlds: Incorporating Provisions of the
Uniform Trust Code into Texas Law, 38 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2006).
16. See English, supra note 2, at 148.
17. Substitute H.B. 1213, 48th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1984).
18. Substitute H.B. 2270, 53d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1994).
19. S.B. 5108, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
20. S.B. 5196, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
21. S.B. 6267, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002).
22. See English, supra note 2, at 144.
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Washington statute and the UTC provision was consistent with
Washington common law. Therefore, any UTC provision that was not
adopted and does not have a corresponding Washington statute is not
necessarily inconsistent with Washington law. The UTC itself is
intended to be supplemented by common law, including the
Restatement, 23 and the Washington statutory revisions are intended only
to override existing common law to the extent the issue is expressly
addressed in the statute.
The 2012 Task Force, largely in reaction to comments from the estate
planning practitioner community, revised several of the statutes enacted
by the 2011 Legislation. The 2013 Legislation introduced additional
concepts from the UTC that the 2012 Task Force felt would both clarify
the implementation of the ideas enacted in the 2011 Legislation and
satisfy Washington practitioners.
II.

DUTIES TO INFORM AND REPORT TO BENEFICIARIES

This Part first describes Washington law regarding a trustee’s duty to
keep beneficiaries informed as it existed before the 2011 Legislation was
adopted. This Part next summarizes the UTC’s approach to the duty to
keep beneficiaries informed, and finally explains how Washington’s
2011 and 2013 Legislation integrated portions of the UTC version of this
duty into Washington law.
The common law has long recognized a general duty of the trustee to
keep beneficiaries informed about trust administration. 24 This duty is
considered necessary to give the beneficiaries enough information to
protect themselves from potential breaches of the trustee’s fiduciary
duty. 25 However, there has been significant disagreement among
jurisdictions about which beneficiaries are owed the duty to inform, how
to comply with the duty, and how to balance some trustors’ desire to
keep a trust secret from the beneficiaries with the concern that a secret
trust may leave beneficiaries’ interests vulnerable.26 The UTC attempted
to tackle this problem in section 813. However, even within the
jurisdictions that have adopted the UTC, the duty to keep beneficiaries
23. See id. at 148.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 (2008); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 173 (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 173 (1935); see also ALAN NEWMAN, GEORGE GLEASON
BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 962 (3d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter BOGERT (Third)].
25. BOGERT (Third), supra note 24, § 962.
26. See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Remainderman: the Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 46
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 173 (2011).
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informed, and in particular any obligation of mandatory reporting, has
been adopted in different and inconsistent formats. 27 Ultimately, while
Washington did not adopt the UTC approach wholesale, the 2013
Legislation brought Washington law closer to the UTC than the 2011
Legislation had, while still preserving the application of Washingtonspecific case law on this issue.
A.

Prior Washington Law

In Washington, before the enactment of the 2011 and 2013
Legislation, the duty of a trustee to keep beneficiaries informed was
determined by statute, by the trust terms, and by the common law. 28 The
seminal Washington case that both confirmed the long-standing concept
of a trustee’s general duty to keep beneficiaries informed and introduced
the concept of providing notice in advance of a significant nonroutine
transaction is Allard v. Pacific National Bank. 29 Allard involved a suit
for breach of fiduciary duty raised by two equal lifetime income
beneficiaries of a trust managed by Pacific National Bank as trustee.30
The sole asset of the trust was a building that was subject to a ninetynine-year lease. 31 The trustee ultimately sold the sole asset of the trust to
the lessee of the property without having explored the fair market value
of the property. 32 One month after the sale transaction was completed,
the trustee notified the current income beneficiaries about the sale. 33
In Allard, the income beneficiaries asserted that the trustee had a duty
to inform them in advance of the proposed sale of the trust’s sole asset,
particularly where the trustee knew that the beneficiaries had expressed a
desire to retain the building. 34 The trustee argued that it had full
authority under the terms of the trust agreement to manage and invest
assets, including the sale of trust assets, and that it had exercised good
faith and honest judgment when consummating the sale of the trust
property. 35 In addition, the trustee argued that since the trust document
did not require it to obtain the consent of the beneficiaries in advance of

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Treu, supra note 8, at 610–21.
See In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 757, 911 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1996).
99 Wash. 2d 394, 663 P.2d 104 (1983).
Id. at 396, 663 P.2d at 106.
Id.
Id. at 397, 663 P.2d at 107.
Id.
Id. at 401, 403, 663 P.2d at 108–10.
Id. at 401, 663 P.2d at 109.
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a sale, there was no correlating duty to inform them of the proposed
sale. 36
The Washington State Supreme Court ultimately held that “the
trustee’s fiduciary duty includes the responsibility to inform the
beneficiaries fully of all facts which would aid them in protecting their
interests.” 37 Expounding upon this general duty, the Court, citing
Professor Bogert’s treatise, 38 held that if beneficiaries are to be able to
hold a trustee accountable, they must know of the nature of the trust
property and how it is being managed. 39 The Court indicated that this
general duty to inform normally is met by trustees delivering periodic
statements of trust activities to the trust beneficiaries.40 The Court then
went further to hold that in the case of a “nonroutine transaction which
significantly affects the trust estate and the interests of the
beneficiaries,” a trustee must inform beneficiaries of all material facts
related to the transaction before the transaction takes place. 41 It is this
last principle for which this case is widely cited and recognized outside
of Washington and by the UTC. 42
In 1984, the year after Allard was decided, the Washington legislature
enacted RCW 11.100.140 43 to clarify the principles raised in Allard,
specifically those surrounding the meaning of a “nonroutine
transaction.” 44 RCW 11.100.140 partially overruled Allard by providing
that absent a “compelling circumstance,” written notice must be sent to
the trustor and to adult mandatory and discretionary income
beneficiaries at least twenty days in advance of specifically enumerated
“significant nonroutine transactions.” Absent the characterization as a
“significant nonroutine transaction,” RCW 11.100.140(6) provides that
the trustee is not absolutely required to provide advance notice of an
intended action, to obtain an independent appraisal, or to sell in an open-

36. Id. at 403, 663 P.2d at 110.
37. Id. at 404, 663 P.2d at 110 (citing Esmieu v. Schrag, 88 Wash. 2d 490, 563 P.2d 203 (1977)).
38. Id. (citing GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES § 961 (2d ed. 1962)).
39. Id.
40. Id. The Court failed to indicate the type of beneficiaries that should receive the periodic
statements.
41. Id. at 404–05, 663 P.2d at 110.
42. U.T.C. § 813 cmt (2010).
43. An Act Relating to Trusts, ch. 149, sec. 114, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 703 (codified as
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.140 (2012)).
44. H. REP. ON H.B. 1213, Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 1984); S. REP. ON ESHB 1213, Reg. Sess., at 2
(Wash. 1984).
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market transaction. 45
Instead of the subjective standard set forth in Allard, there are several
“significant nonroutine transactions” that trigger the trustee’s duty to
provide advance notice: (1) a sale, option lease, or other agreement that
is binding for ten years or more regarding trust real estate that constitutes
twenty-five percent or more of the value of the trust principal; (2) the
sale of tangible personal property that constitutes twenty-five percent or
more of the value of the trust principal; (3) the sale of closely-held
business stock if the stock being sold constitutes twenty-five percent or
more of the corporation’s outstanding shares; and (4) the sale of stock in
a corporation that divests the trust of a controlling interest in the
corporation. 46 The written notice must set forth such material facts as are
necessary to advise the recipient of the nature and terms of the intended
transaction. 47 The trustor may waive the application of RCW 11.100.140
in the trust document and in turn, beneficiaries may also waive the
trustee’s duty to provide them with the notice. 48 Without the specific
waiver of the application of RCW 11.100.140, a trustee, in Washington,
must comply with this statute or risk suit for breach of his fiduciary duty
to keep beneficiaries informed. Presumably, if a beneficiary objects to
the content of the notice, the trustee must be prepared to defend the
manner, method, and details of the transaction disclosed in the notice.
While RCW 11.100.140 refined a subset of the trustee’s duty to keep
beneficiaries informed, the general principles continue to apply. For
example, in an unpublished case, Flohr v. Flohr, 49 the Washington Court
of Appeals, Division One, held that neither Allard nor RCW 11.100.140
relieves a trustee from his general duty to respond to the request of a
remainderman for trust information. 50 The court of appeals relied on the
decision in Tucker v. Brown, 51 which itself cited to the Restatement,
holding that a trustee is under a duty to give a beneficiary, upon his
reasonable request, complete, and accurate information as to the nature
and amount of the trust property. 52 In Flohr, a remainder beneficiary

45. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.100.140(6) (2012). This subsection of the statute is the only portion
that truly “overrules” the holdings of Allard.
46. Id. § 11.100.140(2).
47. Id. § 11.100.140(4).
48. Id. § 11.100.140(5).
49. Flohr v. Flohr, No. 47734-0-I, 2002 WL 528778 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2002), review
denied, 149 Wash. 2d 1002, 67 P.3d 1096 (2003).
50. Id. at *6.
51. 20 Wash. 2d 740, 150 P.2d 604 (1944).
52. Flohr, 2002 WL 528778, at *6.
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repeatedly requested accountings of the trust assets over several years
after she was concerned that the value of the trust was greatly
diminished. 53 The trustee never provided her with any information. 54
The loss to the trust estate was only discovered after the remainderman
filed a request for an accounting with the court. 55
In another recent case, Cook v. Brateng, 56 the Washington Court of
Appeals, Division Two, reaffirmed the general principles of the duty to
keep beneficiaries informed, but muddied the waters with regards to
advance notice of a trustee’s intended actions. This case appeared to
confirm that even in the case of a significant nonroutine transaction that
does not fall into the enumerated categories of RCW 11.100.140, a
trustee may still have a general duty to provide advance notice of the
transaction, despite the language of RCW 11.100.140(6). In Cook, the
trustor had created a revocable trust and had later become incapacitated.
The trustee was his daughter, who was also a remainder beneficiary of
the trust. 57 The trust language required reporting semiannually to the
beneficiaries who were then eligible to receive mandatory or
discretionary distributions of income. 58 The only beneficiary meeting
this criteria while the trustor was alive was the trustor himself, and the
trust document specifically required that the trust make distributions
exclusively for the trustor’s benefit. 59 The other vested remainderman,
the trustee’s brother, ultimately sued the trustee after the trustor’s death
for breach of trust. 60 He claimed that she failed to disclose that she used
liquid trust resources to care for the trustor, and that while she personally
provided care for the trustor, she intended to reimburse herself for her
services to the trustor. 61
The court in Cook held that the trustee had not breached her duty to
inform the remainderman for two reasons. First, neither the trust
document nor the accounting statute 62 required her to provide reports to
remaindermen. 63 Second, since the remainderman had never made a
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
158 Wash. App. 777, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010).
Id. at 782, 262 P.2d at 1230.
Id. at 782–83, 262 P.2d at 1230.
Id. at 782, 262 P.2d at 1230.
Id. at 784, 262 P.2d at 1231.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.020 (2012).
Cook, 158 Wash. App. at 786–87, 262 P.3d at 1232.
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request for information to her or by petition to the court, she hadn’t
failed to respond to a request for information. 64 In addition, the court,
citing Allard, held that the trustee had a duty to inform the remainder
beneficiary about matters that would significantly affect his interest.65
However, the court held that unlike in Allard, the actions of the trustee
in this case were routine and did not warrant notice. 66 While the court
does not explicitly state that the notice of an action with significant
effect must be in advance, one can infer that this was its intent,
particularly with the stated reliance on Allard. In another post-RCW
11.100.140 case, the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three, in
Waits v. Hamlin, 67 also held that a trustee owes duties to inform the
beneficiaries periodically of the status of the trust, its property, and how
it is being managed. 68 The court also went further to hold that the trustee
has a duty to provide advance notice to beneficiaries of a nonroutine
transaction that significantly affects the beneficiaries even when the
transaction does not fit within the categories enumerated in RCW
11.100.140. 69
The courts of appeals, in Cook and Waits, never specifically analyzed
the application of RCW 11.100.140(6) to the facts of either case, even
though both cases were regarding matters that occurred after the statute
was enacted. The only case to have specifically analyzed a trustee’s duty
to inform beneficiaries in advance of a transaction that does not fit
within the enumerated categories of RCW 11.100.140 is the unreported
case of Conran v. Seafirst Bank. 70 In this case, the Washington Court of
Appeals, Division One, held that the trustee had no duty to give advance
notice to remainder beneficiaries of an open market sale of specific
shares of publicly traded stock. 71 The remainderman argued that Allard
provided for two different general duties to beneficiaries, including a
duty to inform the future trust beneficiaries of all material facts “in
connection with a nonroutine transaction which significantly affects the
64. Id. at 787, 262 P.3d at 1232.
65. Id. at 789, 262 P.3d at 1233.
66. Id. The actions were considered routine because the trust clearly provided for the trustee to
spend any amount of trust assets to care for the trustor, and the beneficiaries could reasonably
expect the types of expenses that were incurred for this purpose.
67. 55 Wash. App. 193, 776 P.2d 1003 (1989), review denied, 113 Wash. 2d 1025, 782 P.2d 1071
(1989).
68. Id. at 201, 776 P.2d at 1008.
69. Id. at 202, 776 P.2d at 1009.
70. Conran v. Seafirst Bank, No. 40075-4-I, 1998 WL 40659, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 2,
1998).
71. Id. at *2–3.
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trust estate” and a separate duty to provide information “that would aid
[the beneficiaries] in protecting their interests.” 72 He argued that this
second duty still afforded the obligation of the trustee to provide
advance notice in some cases. 73 The court held that, based upon
legislative history, RCW 11.100.140(6) overruled all of the Allard
holdings regarding the duty to notify beneficiaries in advance, unless the
transaction fell squarely within the enumerated categories of RCW
11.100.140. 74 The court also went further to state that despite the
holding in Waits, the enactment of RCW 11.100.140 precluded the
trustee from having any “statutory duty to inform the beneficiaries as to
the status of the trust after January 1, 1985.” 75
Since the Conran case is unpublished, it cannot be cited as precedent,
and therefore, the interpretation of Allard as expressed in Cook and
Waits is good law in Washington. Cook is the most recently decided case
of all of them. While the court of appeals in Waits was clear in its
recitation that the duty to keep beneficiaries informed included
providing both periodic information and advance notice of transactions
that significantly affect the beneficiaries, the more recent case, Cook,
was less clear. The interplay of these two cases with RCW
11.100.140(6) is also unclear, and unfortunately, the only case to have
directly reviewed the issue is unreported.
Consistent with the case law, the Washington Trustees’ Accounting
Act specifically imposes a duty on the trustee to provide an annual
statement to each adult income beneficiary of a trust unless otherwise
waived by the trustor in the trust document. 76 The obligation to provide
this statement is in addition to any information that should be provided
as part of the general duty to keep beneficiaries informed or any advance
notice specific to RCW 11.100.140. The annual statement provided
pursuant to the accounting statute should include a listing of all current
receipts and disbursements made by the trustee. 77 In addition, any adult
income beneficiary may request an itemized statement of all trust
property. 78
72. Id. at *6 (quoting Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 404–05, 663 P.2d 104, 110
(1983)).
73. Id. at *8.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(1) (2012); id. § 11.106.020. The reference to “adult income
beneficiary” was changed by the 2013 Legislation. See infra Part V.E.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.020.
78. Id.
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Since there is overlap between the information that is to be provided
under the accounting statute and that required by the general duty to
keep beneficiaries informed, compliance with this statute may satisfy all
or a part of a trustee’s general duty, depending upon the relevant
activities of the trust administration. However, unless waived, the duty
to provide the annual statement and to respond to a request for one is a
separate fiduciary obligation of the trustee to provide information. A
trustee has been penalized by having trustee fees denied when a request
for an account statement by a beneficiary was delivered untimely and
only after petition to the court, but was complete, accurate, and showed
no harm to the beneficiaries. 79 However, the trustee was not found to
have breached any fiduciary duty. 80 Presumably, if the untimely account
had uncovered harm to the beneficiaries, the trustee would have been
liable for both the harm and the breach of fiduciary duty for the untimely
account.
Regardless of whether the duty to provide statements and a listing of
assets under the trustee’s Accounting Act is waived in the trust, any
trustee may file an intermediate account of trust activity with the court.81
Any trustor or beneficiary may petition the court to direct the trustee to
file an account of the trust. 82 The beneficiaries (and presumably the
trustor) do not have an absolute right to an accounting when petitioning
to request one; rather, the court may order one in the exercise of its
discretion. 83
The trustee’s duty to keep beneficiaries informed is not entirely clear
in Washington, particularly given how case law has interpreted the
interplay between Allard and RCW 11.100.140. In addition, the
overlapping types of information to be produced as described in the case
law, RCW 11.100.104 and RCW 11.106.020, as well as the ability of the
trustor to modify many of these obligations in the trust document, create
a maze of standards for a Washington trustee. However, even assuming
that the courts of appeals are incorrect in their holdings in Cook and
Waits regarding the duty to provide advance notice to beneficiaries, it

79. In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 758, 911 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1996).
80. Id. at 761, 911 P.2d at 1023.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.106.030.
82. Id. § 11.106.040; cf. In re Estate of Hitchcock, 140 Wash. App. 526, 531, 167 P.3d 1180,
1183 (2007) (holding that waiver of “all duties imposed by [the trustees’ accounting act] and from
provisions of the probate statutes” in the trust document, did not relieve trustees from their
obligation to provide trust beneficiary with an accounting of trust upon a petition requesting an
account).
83. In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. at 758, 911 P.2d at 1021.
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would generally be appropriate to surmise that in Washington, before the
2011 and 2013 Legislation, the general duty to keep beneficiaries
informed includes the obligation to communicate regularly with the
beneficiaries by providing periodic statements of the trust activity and to
respond to reasonable requests from at least the current and remainder
trust beneficiaries. In addition, the trustee might also consider providing
some type of advance notice of an activity that may significantly affect
the interests of the beneficiaries, even if such activity does not fall
within the definition of a “significant nonroutine transaction” as defined
by statute. 84 Further, unless waived in the trust document, the trustee
must timely comply with the separate obligations outlined in RCW
11.106.020 regarding an annual statement or a requested listing of trust
assets, and in RCW 11.100.140 if a proposed action does fall within the
statutory definition of a “significant nonroutine transaction.” Unlike the
UTC, Washington law has not historically had a clear path for the trustee
to follow regarding the beneficiaries to whom the duty is owed and the
information that must be given to them. Compliance with the duty to
inform under Washington law has always been heavily fact dependent.
B.

Duties to Inform and Report Under the UTC

Section 813 of the UTC provides for a trustee’s general obligation to
keep trust beneficiaries reasonably informed. It also provides for specific
duties to deliver certain types of administration information to trust
beneficiaries. 85 To understand how the duty to keep beneficiaries
informed works in the context of the UTC, it is important to understand
the terminology used by the UTC. Under the UTC, the “qualified
beneficiaries” are essentially the current mandatory or discretionary trust
beneficiaries and the presumptive remaindermen who exist at the time
that the qualified beneficiary status is being determined. 86 While not
specifically defined in the UTC, the plain meaning of the “permissible
distributee[s]” of a trust are the trust beneficiaries who are currently
eligible to receive mandatory or discretionary trust distributions.87
84. The potential benefit of providing advance notice of an action may be greater when the trustee
is aware that the beneficiaries have expressed an interest in or attachment to certain trust property.
85. U.T.C. § 813 (2010).
86. Id. § 103(13). The qualified beneficiaries also include those types of trust beneficiaries
described in UTC section 110, although for the purposes of this Article, the authors refer to the
more common situation of permissible distributees and presumptive remaindermen.
87. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 130.010(10) (2011). The Oregon adoption of the UTC defined
“permissible distributee” in this way, which is not contradictory to the manner in which UTC
section 103(13) refers to these types of beneficiaries.
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Finally, under the UTC, a “beneficiary” is a person that “has a present or
future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent; or in a capacity
other than that of trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust
property.” 88 Generally speaking, a permissible distributee is also a
qualified beneficiary, and both categories are also considered
beneficiaries under the UTC; however, it is possible to be just a
beneficiary who is neither a permissible distributee or a qualified
beneficiary (referred to in this Article as a nonqualified beneficiary).
1.

General Duty to Inform

Section 813(a) of the UTC provides for an affirmative general duty of
the trustee to “keep the qualified beneficiaries of a trust reasonably
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts
necessary for them to protect their interests.” 89 This section also
provides that any beneficiary may request information and the trustee
must respond to such request, if reasonable under the circumstances.90
The comments to section 813(a) indicate that the limitation of this duty
to the qualified beneficiaries was intentional and was meant to extend
the trustee’s affirmative duty only to the “stakeholders” of the trust. 91
The use of the term “beneficiary” in relation to the right to request
information allows for more remote, contingent beneficiaries an
opportunity to ask for information, recognizing that the UTC did not
want to eliminate the rights of the more remote beneficiaries to trust
administration. 92 However, in the context of a request for information,
there is no stated timeline for a trustee to respond to a request and the
trustee has the discretion to determine whether the request is reasonable.
There is no bright line rule regarding how to satisfy the general duty
to keep the qualified beneficiaries informed. The trustee must ultimately
determine what information to provide to the beneficiaries. The
comments to section 813 indicate that the general duty is essentially
satisfied with respect to at least the permissible distributees if the trustee
provides them with the annual report described in section 813(c) (and
described in Part II.B.2 below). One can therefore surmise that the
trustee must consider whether any additional information should be
delivered to the remaindermen (i.e., the remaining qualified
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

U.T.C. § 103(3).
Id. § 813(a).
Id.
See id. § 813(a) cmt.
Id.
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beneficiaries), considering that the interests of the remaindermen are by
nature different than those of the permissible distributees. The general
duty to keep qualified beneficiaries informed may also require that the
trustee provide advance notice to the qualified beneficiaries of a
proposed transaction with trust property in order to permit the
beneficiary to protect his or her interest. The comments of section 813,
citing Allard discussed above, indicate that advance notice of
transactions involving the sale of real estate, closely-held business
assets, or unique trust assets may be necessary or at least prudent
practice. 93
2.

Specific Reporting Requirements

In addition to the general duty described above, section 813(b) and (c)
provide for specifically enumerated duties to provide certain trust
administration information to certain types of beneficiaries (referred to
in this Article as “reporting requirements”). The trustee has a duty to
provide an entire copy of the trust instrument to a beneficiary upon
request, rather than just parts that the trustee deems relevant to a
beneficiary. 94 The duty to provide notice of the acceptance of trusteeship
and of trustee contact information is triggered when a trustee accepts the
office of trustee (either when an irrevocable trust is created or upon a
successive change of trustee), and must be delivered to the qualified
beneficiaries within sixty days of such acceptance.95 Acceptance of the
trusteeship is described in UTC section 701. The duty to provide notice
of the existence of a trust is independent of the duty to provide notice of
acceptance of the trusteeship, although occasionally they will overlap.
To comply with the requirement to provide notice of the existence of
trust, the trustee must provide four pieces of information to the qualified
beneficiaries: (1) notice that the trust exists; (2) the identity of the settlor
or settlors; (3) notice of the right to request a copy of the trust
instrument; and (4) notice of the right to a trustee’s report, within sixty
days after the date the trustee acquires knowledge of the creation of an
irrevocable trust, or the date the trustee acquires knowledge that a
formerly revocable trust has become irrevocable.96 While the notice of
the existence of a trust is a critical step towards fully informing
93. See U.T.C. § 813(a) cmt (referencing Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 663 P.2d
104 (1983)).
94. Id. § 813(b) cmt.
95. Id. § 813(b)(2).
96. Id. § 813(b)(2)–(3).
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beneficiaries about the trust from which they benefit, the requirement to
deliver such notice as triggered by knowledge of the irrevocability trust,
as opposed to acceptance of the trusteeship, seems impractical at best.97
The trustee also has the duty to provide a trustee report at least
annually and upon the termination of the trust. 98 The trust reports must
be delivered to the permissible distributees and to other qualified or
nonqualified beneficiaries who request it. 99 In addition, the last serving
trustee must send a trustee report to the qualified beneficiaries in the
event of a vacancy of the trusteeship. 100 The trustee report must include
a listing of the trust assets (including their current, fair market value, if
possible), the trust liabilities, trust receipts and disbursements, and the
source and amount of the trustee’s compensation. 101 The comments to
section 813 of the UTC make it clear that the trustee report does not
need to equate a formal accounting.
3.

Duties for a Revocable Trust—Statutory Exception

While a trust is revocable, and the trustor has the capacity to revoke
the trust, the duties delineated in UTC section 813 are only owed to the
trustor of the trust, thereby creating a statutory exception. 102 In 2004, the
language referencing the trustor’s capacity to revoke the trust was
bracketed, recognizing both that determining the trustor’s capacity to
revoke the trust may be difficult and impractical and that some
jurisdictions may wish to treat the revocable trust as a will substitute,
making the revocable trust relevant to the beneficiaries only at the death
of the trustor. 103 Section 603(b) of the UTC provides that during the
period of permissible exercise, the holder of a power of withdrawal will
be treated the same as the trustor of a revocable trust described in section

97. Acquiring knowledge that an irrevocable trust exists (e.g., the death of the trustor of a
revocable trust) may occur well before any trustee has formally accepted the trusteeship, and in
some cases, it is important to preserve the ability to reject a trusteeship to avoid the application of
non-resident state income tax to a trust sited in a state without income tax. Presumably, if a person
nominated to be trustee acts in haste to deliver any of the notices described in UTC section 813(b)
in order to comply with the sixty-day timeline, he or she may have simultaneously accepted the
trusteeship under UTC section 701(a)(2), precluding later rejection of the trusteeship.
98. U.T.C. § 813(c).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 603(a).
103. Id. § 603(a) cmt to 2004 amend.
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603(a). 104
4.

Waiver of the Duties to Inform

The UTC operates as a set of default provisions that may be waived
or modified by the trustor in the trust document, except for the
provisions contained in UTC section 105. The UTC does not preclude
the trustor from waiving the general duty to keep the qualified
beneficiaries informed. 105 However, the UTC does preclude a trustor
from waiving the duty to inform qualified beneficiaries who are twentyfive or older of the existence of the trust, the trustee’s identity, and the
beneficiary’s right to request trust reports. 106 In addition, the UTC
precludes the trustor from waiving the trustee’s duty to respond to any
beneficiary’s request for reasonable trust administration information. 107
The Uniform Law Commissioners, in 2004, bracketed both of these
“mandatory reporting requirements” because there was such a lack of
consensus about the adoption of the mandatory rules. 108
A beneficiary may always waive his or her right to notice, to
administration information the trustee would otherwise be required to
deliver (e.g., advance notice of a compensation change) or to trustee
reports. 109 A beneficiary may withdraw his or her waiver at any time. 110
Waiver by a beneficiary does not relieve the trustee from any liability
resulting from actions that notice or a report would have otherwise
104. A holder of a power of withdrawal is defined in UTC section 103(11) as having a “presently
exercisable general power of appointment other than a power: (A) exercisable by a trustee and
limited by an ascertainable standard; or (B) exercisable by another person only upon consent of the
trustee or a person holding an adverse interest.” Id. § 103(11). Practically speaking, this means that
a beneficiary who holds a right to withdraw a contribution to trust so that the contribution qualifies
for the annual exclusion from federal gift tax (often referred to as a Crummey power) is treated as a
trustor for the purposes of UTC section 813 for the duration of the right of withdrawal. See
Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 84–86 (9th Cir. 1968). If the right of withdrawal is unlimited or
is cumulative, then there may be portions of a trust for which the trustee needs only to deliver
information to the beneficiary holding the withdrawal right. This provision was not adopted in
Washington.
105. Id. § 105 cmt.
106. Id. § 105(b)(8).
107. Id. § 105(b)(9).
108. However, the Commissioners still included these mandatory reporting requirements despite
the classic objections to providing trust information to a beneficiary: (1) the beneficiary is too
immature to know about the amount of assets held in trust; (2) the beneficiary is not yet selfsufficient and will never be if knowledge of the trust assets occurs too early; and (3) the settlor is in
the best position to know of the effect of trust wealth on a beneficiary and should therefore be able
to control the flow of information. See id. § 105(b)(8)–(9) cmts.
109. Id. § 109(c).
110. Id. § 813(d).
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disclosed. Only informed consent or a bona fide release by a beneficiary
may absolve a trustee from liability for actions.111 Therefore, for a
trustee who would like to have the benefit of triggering the statute of
limitations on breach of trust claims, disclosure of trust administration to
a beneficiary, rather than waiver of the right to receive or obtain
information by a beneficiary, is key.
C.

Washington’s 2011 Legislation

The 2003 Task Force was split on the approach to codifying a duty to
provide mandatory notice or information to beneficiaries. It polled
members of the WSBA Real Property, Probate, and Trust Section
(WSBA RPPT), and that poll indicated that members wanted to retain a
mandatory duty to provide notice. 112 The 2003 Task Force then decided
that its general approach would be to codify the common law duty of
notice and give some certainty to trustees regarding the extent of that
duty, given the lack of specific directions under common law.
1.

General Duty to Inform

The 2011 Legislation intended to both codify the law in Washington
as it existed before the 2011 Legislation and to incorporate a modified
version of the UTC. The legislation introduced new provisions that
codified the general duty of a trustee to keep beneficiaries “reasonably
informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts
necessary for them to protect their interests.” 113 While the statute’s
description of the duty is similar to the language in section 813(a) of the
UTC, it also is an apt description of the general duty as it existed in
Washington case law before the 2011 Legislation. 114
Unlike the UTC’s general duty, which is affirmatively owed only to
the qualified beneficiaries and then to non-qualified beneficiaries upon
reasonable request, the 2011 Legislation specified that the general duty
was owed to a broader group of persons. The Washington general duty
was owed to all of the “persons interested in the trust” and to all persons
“who would be entitled to notice [of judicial proceedings regarding the
trust under RCW Chapter 11.96A].” 115 “Persons interested in the trust”
111. Id. § 817(c).
112. The poll was taken at the 2006 WSBA RPPT midyear. Copies of the ballots are on file with
the Washington Law Review.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3) (2012).
114. See supra notes 28–84 and accompanying text.
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3).
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included not only all beneficiaries of the trust, but it also included the
trustor, if living, any person holding powers over the trust assets, and the
Attorney General in certain circumstances where charitable interests are
involved. 116 For all practical purposes, the “persons interested in the
trust” are the same as the persons entitled to notice of judicial
proceedings involving a trust. However, this group could be narrowed by
utilizing virtual representation by persons with similar interests.117 This
group of individuals to whom the Washington general duty was owed
under the 2011 Legislation is referred to in this Article below as the
“Interested Parties.”
Unlike the UTC, which merely indicates in its comments that
compliance with specific reporting requirements will satisfy the general
duty to inform, the 2011 Legislation provided a roadmap for trustees to
comply with the general duty. RCW 11.97.010(3) incorporated a “safe
harbor” for trustees, whereby if a trustee prepared and disseminated a
report regarding trust activity, the trustee was presumed to have satisfied
the general duty to provide information with respect to the recipients. 118
To comply with the statute, the “safe harbor” report had to include
information about the trust administration for the reporting period that
are relevant of the items specifically listed in the statute, namely:
(1) A statement of receipts and disbursements of principal and
income;
(2) A statement of the assets and liabilities of the trust and their
values at the beginning and ending of the reporting period;
(3) Trustee compensation paid;
(4) All agents hired by the trustees, their relationship and any
compensation paid;
(5) Disclosure of any pledge, mortgage, option, lease, or other
agreement affecting trust property for five or more years that
was entered into during the reporting period;
(6) Adequate disclosure of all transactions engaged in where a
trustee personally benefitted; and
(7) Notice to the recipient that they may request a formal accounting
and that they have three years to sue the trustees for breach of
trust based upon the actions disclosed in the report. 119
The delivery of the “safe harbor” report was not mandatory, nor was a
116. Id. § 11.96A.030(6).
117. See infra Part III.
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3), amended by S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 7 (Wash.
2013) (removing the safe harbor presumption).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(3)(a)–(h).
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time period for delivery prescribed by the statute. The determination of
whether to deliver the report and thereafter how often to deliver the
report was to have been made entirely by the trustee.
The 2011 Legislation also provided that the preparation and
dissemination of the “safe harbor” report triggered the running of the
statute of limitations, with respect to each report recipient, for a breach
of trust claim related to the content disclosed in the report. 120 The
modification to the statute of limitations is described further in Part V.B.
of this Article.
By providing a list of items to include in a “safe harbor” report, the
2011 Legislation introduced greater certainty regarding compliance with
the general duty to inform than the existing case law provided for
trustees. It also went further than the UTC by specifically indicating that
the delivery of a safe harbor report created a presumption that the
general duty was satisfied. 121 However, a trustee who wanted to ensure
that he was meeting the general duty to inform under the 2011
Legislation had to deliver “safe harbor” reports to all of the Interested
Parties related to the trust, which was a potentially unwieldy number of
recipients. 122
Another component of the general duty to inform that the 2011
Legislation integrated into Washington law was the trustee’s duty to
respond to any beneficiary’s request for information, unless it was
unreasonable under the circumstances. 123 In addition, the 2011
Legislation included another provision that mandated that the trustee
respond to the request of an Interested Person within sixty days if the
Interested Person requested “information reasonably necessary to enable
[him or her] to enforce his or her rights under the trust.” 124 These duties
to respond to requests for information modified the scope of the trustee’s
duty to respond to requests under pre-2011 Washington law and went
further than the UTC as well. Prior Washington case law and the UTC
generally provided that the trustee had a duty to provide information to
any trust beneficiary upon request. 125 The new Washington standard
provided an opportunity for any Interested Party to request information

120. Id. § 11.96A.070(1)(b).
121. Id. § 11.97.010(3).
122. Id.
123. Id. § 11.97.010(4).
124. Id. § 11.97.010(5).
125. Allard v. Pac. Nat’l Bank, 99 Wash. 2d 394, 403–05, 663 P.2d 104, 110–11 (1983); U.T.C.
§ 813 (2010).
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from the trustee. 126 There was also a response period with which to
comply, where there had never been one before in Washington and was
not one in the UTC.
2.

Specific Reporting Requirements

The 2011 Legislation integrated a slightly modified set of the
reporting requirements set forth in sections 813(b) and (c) of the UTC.
The new RCW 11.97.010(2) provided that the trustee, for all trusts that
were created or became irrevocable after December 31, 2011, was
required to deliver notice of several pieces of information: (1) the
existence of trust; (2) the identity of the trustor(s); (3) the trustee’s
contact information; and (4) the right to request trust administration
information that is reasonably necessary to enable the beneficiary to
protect his interest. This new mandatory notice had to be delivered to all
Interested Parties within sixty days of the date of acceptance of the
position of trustee or of the date that the trustee of a formerly revocable
trust acquired knowledge that such trust had become irrevocable. 127 This
specific notice may be referred to in this Article as the “sixty days’
notice requirement.”
After enactment of the 2011 Legislation, many Washington estate
planning practitioners indicated that compliance with this new
mandatory duty to provide sixty days’ notice was objectionable to many
of their clients who wished to create trusts in Washington. While the
timeframe and triggering events for the mandatory notice under the
Washington law was the same as the UTC, the Washington version of
the mandatory notice had to be delivered to a broader category of people
than the qualified beneficiaries. 128 To accommodate the difference
between the UTC’s representation statutes and the Washington virtual
representation statute, 129 the 2011 Legislation specifically indicated that
the new mandatory notice for the benefit of a minor could be delivered
to the minor’s parent if no guardian had been appointed for the minor. 130
In addition, the 2011 Legislation specifically indicated that the new
mandatory notice did not have to be delivered to a charity whose only
interest in the trust was a future interest that could be revoked; instead,

126. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(5).
127. Id. § 11.97.010(2).
128. Compare id., with U.T.C. § 103(13) (defining “qualified beneficiary”).
129. The UTC allowed representation of a minor by a parent, but that provision was not adopted
in the 2011 Legislation. See infra notes 257–360 and accompanying text.
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(2).
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the notice could be delivered to the Attorney General. 131
The 2011 Legislation did not specifically adopt the UTC section
813(b)(1) duty to provide a copy of the trust upon request of a
beneficiary. Instead, under the 2011 Legislation all Interested Parties
could request information about the trust terms from the trustee. 132 The
statute effectively then stated that delivery of the entire trust instrument
was presumed to have “satisf[ied] the trustee’s obligations under this
subsection” if the request was concerning terms of the trust and if the
request also was reasonably necessary to allow the requesting party the
ability to enforce his or her rights under the trust. 133 The analysis of
whether the request involved trust terms and whether the request was
necessary was entirely dependent upon the trustee’s independent
determination. By creating a presumption upon the delivery of the entire
trust instrument, the statute also left room for the trustee to determine
that the beneficiary did not need to see the entire trust instrument.
The 2011 Legislation did not include sections 813(b)(4) or 813(c) of
the UTC regarding advance notice of trustee compensation and
mandatory periodic trustee reports. Instead, those items were integrated
into the new Washington law vis-à-vis the “safe harbor” reports
described above in Part II.C.1.
3.

Duties for a Revocable Trust—Statutory Exception

The 2011 Legislation adopted the core provisions of the UTC
regarding revocable trusts. Essentially, while a trust is revocable, the
rights of beneficiaries are subject to the control of the trustor and the
duties of the trustee are owed only to the trustor. 134 The 2011 Legislation
declined to include the bracketed UTC language that also required that
the trustor specifically have capacity for this exception to apply. 135 For
the purposes of the duties to inform, this meant that for revocable trusts,
while the trustor was alive, only the trustor was entitled to information
about trust administration, thereby creating an exception to the duties to
inform.

131. Id.
132. Id. § 11.97.010(5).
133. Id.
134. Id. § 11.103.040.
135. See U.T.C. § 603(a) (2010); infra notes 454–455 and accompanying text (discussing
Washington’s version of UTC section 603).
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Waiver of the Duties to Inform

The 2011 Legislation did not permit any waiver or modification of the
trustee’s general duty to keep beneficiaries informed or of any of the
specific reporting requirements.136 The 2011 Legislation also declined to
include the option to appoint a third-party representative or surrogate to
accept trust information on behalf of beneficiaries. 137 The 2011
Legislation did include a new provision in the virtual representation
statute, allowing a person holding a power of appointment to virtually
represent persons whose interests were subject to the power of
appointment. 138 The 2003 Task Force included that provision to allow a
trustor who did not want the trustee to be forced to give the sixty days’
notice to remaindermen the ability to avoid notice by including a power
of appointment. 139
Unlike the UTC, 140 the 2011 Legislation did not include the specific
ability of a beneficiary to waive the right to receive trust information
from the trustee. However, the legislation did include the UTC provision
specifically validating a beneficiary’s consent, release, and ratification of
a trustee’s act unless it was obtained by improper means. 141 This statute
implies that a beneficiary could knowingly consent to not receive trust
information.
D.

Washington’s 2013 Legislation

The 2013 Legislation significantly modified the 2011 Legislation
regarding the trustee’s duty to keep beneficiaries informed. There was
considerable discussion among estate planning practitioners about the
practicality of many of the provisions relating to the duty to inform as
adopted by the 2011 Legislation. In particular, there was appreciable
discord about the duty to provide mandatory notice as required by the
2011 Legislation. The 2013 Legislation sought to incorporate more
concepts from the UTC in an effort to standardize the law where
desirable and to make it easier and more efficient to comply with the
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.97.010(1).
137. For an example of a statute that provides such an option see OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3)(b)
(2011).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(d).
139. As discussed in Part IV of this Article, reliance on the virtual representation statutes as a
“waiver” of the duty to inform is not a perfect solution due to potential conflicts of interest among
beneficiaries.
140. U.T.C. § 813(d).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.107 (discussed infra Part V.Q.).
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provisions adopted by the 2011 Legislation.
1.

General Duty to Inform

The 2013 Legislation moved the notice-related requirements to RCW
11.98 and adopted the UTC definitions of “permissible distributee” and
“qualified beneficiary” for purposes of RCW 11.98. 142 The 2013
Legislation modified the general duty to require the trustee to keep all
qualified beneficiaries of a trust “reasonably informed about the
administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests.” 143 In addition, the revised general duty also now
requires the trustee to respond promptly to any beneficiary’s request for
information related to the administration of the trust, unless the request
is unreasonable under the circumstances. 144 The revised general duty is
taken verbatim from section 813(a) of the UTC. There are four
significant changes from the 2011 Legislation: (1) the narrower scope of
beneficiaries to whom the general duty is owed; (2) the method of
compliance with the general duty; (3) the removal of a time period in
which to respond to a request for information; and (4) an additional
exception to the application of the general duty.
The use of the phrase “qualified beneficiaries” limits the potential
persons to whom the general duty to inform is owed. The result of this
limitation is that the information need not be affirmatively furnished to
Interested Parties who are not also qualified beneficiaries. However, in
an effort not to preclude more remote trust beneficiaries from having
access to trust information, beneficiaries with remote remainder interests
(i.e., nonqualified beneficiaries) may request information from the
trustee. The class of persons who can request information from the
trustee no longer includes anyone beyond trust beneficiaries (e.g., the
trustor). The sixty-day time period for response to a reasonable request
that was included in the 2011 Legislation no longer exists. 145 The 2012
Task Force felt that the function of the sixty-day time period was to
provide leverage to a beneficiary who was requesting information, but
that compliance with the time period might be difficult for the trustee. In
order to provide some leverage for beneficiaries, the 2013 Legislation
instead included a provision allowing a qualified beneficiary to obtain an
order for costs and reasonable attorney’s fees if he or she is forced to
142.
143.
144.
145.

S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 8(1)–(2) (Wash. 2013).
Id. § 16(1).
Id.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.97.010 (West 2013).
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compel production of information from the trustee. 146
The 2013 Legislation also removed the “safe harbor report” language
from the general duty to inform statute, effectively removing any
presumption that the trustee has complied with the duty by providing
certain enumerated information. 147 The practitioner community was
specifically concerned about the presumption, fearing that it might serve
to create a minimum level of communication from the trustee, when that
minimum level was potentially a higher standard than originally
provided for under Washington law. The 2013 Legislation did not
remove the correlating report section from the statute of limitations
section. 148 Therefore, a trustee who would like to trigger the running of
the statute of limitations for a breach of trust claim still has a guideline
to follow regarding the necessary information to disseminate.
The removal of the “safe harbor” also means that the manner and
method of compliance with the general duty to keep beneficiaries
informed is the same as articulated in Washington case law described in
Part II.A, with the exception of the change in the types of beneficiaries
to whom the duty is owed and the application of the statutory exceptions
described in Part II.D.3 below. 149 The trustee is entirely responsible for
determining the timing and method of complying with the general duty.
Generally, the more information that is shared, the more likely the
trustee has satisfied this general duty. With respect to periodic reporting,
in some cases, providing the qualified beneficiaries with a copy of an
annual account or brokerage statement and responding to any reasonable
requests for relevant information may be sufficient to satisfy the duty.
As mentioned in Part II.A, there may be other circumstances where a
trustee may consider providing the qualified beneficiaries with
additional information or information in advance of a transaction. The
trustee will have to be flexible and adjust his or her reporting to
beneficiaries to suit the activity in and assets of the trust. Note that, as
indicated in Part II.A of this Article, compliance with the general duty
does not preclude a trustee from also having to comply with the specific
and independent reporting required by RCW 11.100.140 and RCW
11.106.020.

146.
147.
148.
149.

See S.B. 5344 § 16(1).
See id.
See infra notes 386–393 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–120 and accompanying text.
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Specific Reporting Requirements

The 2013 Legislation slightly modified the scope of and the triggering
events for the mandatory reporting described in Part II.C.2 of this Article
to make it more similar to UTC sections 813(b)(2) and (3). The trustee,
for all trusts that were created or became irrevocable after December 31,
2011, is now required to deliver notice of several pieces of information:
(1) the existence of the trust; (2) the identity of the trustor(s); (3) the
trustee’s contact information; and (4) the right to request trust
administration information that is reasonably necessary to enable the
beneficiary to protect his interest. 150 Like the general duty to inform, the
class of persons who are entitled to this notice is now limited to the
qualified beneficiaries. This approach mirrors UTC sections 813(b)(2)
and (3).
The trustee must deliver this notice within sixty days from the
acceptance of the position of the trustee.151 The 2013 Legislation
removed any reference tying the sixty-day notice period to “knowledge”
that a trust has become irrevocable and instead used the phrase
“acceptance of the position of trustee” to provide for a clear point that
triggers the sixty-day notice period. 152 In addition, the 2013 Legislation
incorporated the “acceptance of trusteeship” statute from the UTC to
provide further clarification to the trustee, which is discussed further in
Part IV of this Article. In addition, the changes made to the virtual
representation statute in the 2013 Legislation allow delivery of a minor’s
report to a parent and a divestible charity’s interests to the Attorney
General so specific reference in the notice statute to those categories of
beneficiaries became unnecessary and were deleted. 153 The changes to
the Washington virtual representation statute are discussed in detail in
Part IV of this Article.
The 2013 Legislation also clarified the statute regarding the
obligation to provide beneficiaries with a copy of the trust upon request.
The new statute made it clear that the trustee is deemed to have satisfied
a request regarding the trust terms if the trustee provides a copy of the
complete trust document. 154 The result of the language is the same as it
was under the 2011 Legislation. 155 The trustee may still determine
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

S.B. 5344 § 16(2).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 5(4)(f), 5(10).
Id. § 16(1).
See supra notes 132–133 and accompanying text.
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whether to provide the complete copy of the trust document. 156 Also,
like the 2011 Legislation, the 2013 Legislation did not include any
reference to sections 813(b)(4) or 813(c) of the UTC regarding advance
notice of trustee compensation and mandatory periodic trustee reports.
Because the “safe harbor” reports were also removed, the trustee will
have to independently determine whether providing advance notice of
compensation changes and whether annual trustee reports and reports
upon termination of trust are necessary under the case law defining the
general duty. As stated above, it is clear that some type of periodic
reporting is part of the trustee’s duty under Washington law, 157 although
there are no cases that discuss advance notice of a change in trustee
compensation.
3.

Duties for Revocable Trusts or “Spousal Trusts”—Statutory
Exceptions

The 2013 Legislation clarified that there are two statutory exceptions
to the general duty to inform and the specific reporting requirements, by
maintaining one exception from 2011, and adding a new one. The
provisions adopted in RCW 11.103.040 of the 2011 Legislation were
maintained. Slight modifications were made to confirm that this
principle continues to apply while a trustor of a revocable trust was
living. 158 In addition, a reference was added in RCW 11.103.040 to the
new duty to inform provisions of RCW 11.98, clarifying how this
principle applied to the trustee’s duty to inform. 159 The 2013 Legislation
introduced a new provision providing for a general exception to the duty
to inform in the case of a trust where the spouse 160 of the trustor is the
only permissible distributee and the descendants of the spouse and
trustor are remaindermen. In such a case, as long as the spouse has
capacity, the trustee only has to deliver the requisite trust information to
the trustor’s spouse. A similar exception was implemented, for example,

156. S.B. 5344 § 16(1).
157. See supra Part II.A.
158. S.B. 5344 § 16(4); see also infra Part V.K. (describing changes made to RCW Chapter
11.103, and removing any references to the trustor’s ability or capacity to revoke the revocable
trust).
159. S.B. 5344 § 16(4); see also infra Part V.K.
160. See S.B. 5344 § 16(3). While the statute as adopted references “domestic partner” in
addition to the spouse of the trustor, the inclusion of the term will soon be superfluous. Due to RCW
26.60.100, domestic partners in Washington who do not dissolve the partnership before June 30,
2014, will become spouses for purposes of Washington law.
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in the Oregon adoption of the UTC. 161 However, the 2012 Task Force
chose not to limit this exception to cases of “surviving spouses,”
particularly where “spousal benefits trusts” 162 became very popular
estate planning vehicles in 2012.
4.

Waiver of the Duties to Inform and the Statutory Exceptions

As a general prohibition, the new RCW 11.97.010 provides that the
trustor may not modify the trustee’s general duty to provide information
to the qualified beneficiaries or to respond to the request of any trust
beneficiary. 163 In addition, RCW 11.97.010 provides that the definitions
of “qualified beneficiary” and “permissible distributee” may not be
modified by the trustor. 164 Any reference to the inability to waive the
mandatory sixty-day notice implemented in the 2011 Legislation has
been removed. The 2013 Legislation did not modify any provisions
regarding a beneficiary’s ability to waive the application of any duties
owed to him or her.
Specific provisions permitting the waiver or modification of the duty
to provide the sixty days’ notice of the existence of trust and of the
application of the “spousal trust” statutory exception in a separate
writing were also included in the notice provisions of RCW 11.98. 165
The 2012 Task Force wanted to provide a mechanism to allow the
trustor to modify the mandatory notice requirement in trusts that are
already irrevocable without having to actually modify the trust document
itself. A similar approach was taken, for example, in the Oregon
adoption of the UTC. 166
Because the new statutory structure creates exceptions to the duties to
inform and then permits waiver or modification of the sixty days’ notice
obligation itself and of the exceptions to the duties to inform, this Article
will review each scenario independently, even if repetitive.
Section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 permits the trustor to waive or
modify the specific duty of the trustee to provide sixty days’ notice of
161. See OR. REV. STAT. § 130.710(8) (2011).
162. A spousal benefits trust is an inter vivos irrevocable trust created by a trustor for the lifetime
benefit of his or her spouse. It was a technique used frequently in 2012 to utilize the trustor’s
available federal exemption equivalent amount in advance of the potential decrease in such amount
from $5 million to roughly $1 million for federal estate tax law purposes.
163. Nothing in section 16(1) of Senate Bill 5344 may be modified by the trustor. See S.B. 5344
§ 16(1).
164. Id. § 7.
165. Id. § 16(5).
166. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3).
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the existence of trust. The new RCW 11.97.010, by omission, impliedly
permits the trustor to waive or modify the specific duty to provide the
sixty days’ notice. The major difference between these two provisions is
that section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 permits waiver or modification by
a separate writing in addition to waiver or modification by the terms of
the trust document. These provisions ultimately allow the trustor to, for
example, provide that the trustee shall not be required to deliver notice
of the existence of trust, or alternatively, that the trustee be required to
deliver such notice only to the qualified beneficiaries that are over a
certain age.
Section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 also permits the trustor to waive or
modify the application of the “spousal trust” exception to the duties to
inform. The new RCW 11.97.010, also by omission, impliedly permits
this waiver or modification, but as described above, section 16(5) of
Senate Bill 5344 permits waiver or modification by a separate writing in
addition to waiver or modification by the terms of the trust document.
These waiver provisions ultimately allow the trustor to, for example,
provide that the trustee must provide marital trust administration
information to the remainder beneficiaries (e.g., his and his spouse’s
children) for the duration of trust, regardless of whether his spouse has
capacity.
The new RCW 11.97.010, again by omission, impliedly permits the
trustor to waive or modify, in the trust agreement, the “revocable trust”
exception to the duties to inform. This waiver provision allows the
trustor to, for example, provide that another beneficiary—perhaps his
spouse—is entitled to and must receive trust administration information
while he is alive, particularly if he is incapacitated. The ability to waive
or modify the “revocable trust” exception by a separate writing was not
included in section 16(5) of Senate Bill 5344 because in the revocable
trust context, the 2012 Task Force felt that it was best practice for the
trustor to incorporate the waiver or modification into the terms of a
revocable trust by actually amending the trust.
5.

Effective Dates of the New Notice-Related Provisions

The 2011 Legislation contains a general effective date provision that
states that it applies to all existing trusts and trusts created after the date
of the act, except as otherwise provided,167 and the 2013 Legislation has
a similar provision.168 The provisions regarding the duty to inform in the
167. H.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40 (Wash. 2011).
168. S.B. 5344 § 28.

05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

844

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 10:31 AM

[Vol. 88:813

2011 and 2013 legislation, however, have a specific effective date
provision. The 2011 Legislation provided that the sixty days’ notice of
the existence of a trust required under RCW 11.97.010(2) applied only
to trusts that were either created or became irrevocable after December
31, 2011 169 and the 2013 Legislation also provides that the revised sixty
days’ notice requirements under RCW 11.98 apply only to trusts that are
created or become irrevocable after December 31, 2011. 170 As
mentioned above, a trustor may waive or modify certain duties to inform
at any time, even after creation or irrevocability of the trust,171 so a
trustor wanting to take advantage of the new waiver provisions can do so
now.
In the absence of a waiver or modification by the trustor, the sixty
days’ notice provisions of the 2011 Legislation were binding on trustees
and their actions for the period from January 1, 2012 172 until July 28,
2013. 173 However, as described above, 174 the Court of Appeals held in In
re Estate of Ehlers that delivering an untimely accounting per RCW
11.106 that was complete, accurate, and showed no harm to the
beneficiaries was not a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty. 175
Presumably, by analogy, if the trustee’s specific duty is waived later by
the trustor and no harm to the beneficiaries has occurred, then a trustee’s
failure to deliver the sixty days’ notice during the gap between the 2011
and 2013 Legislation will not, by itself, give rise to an actionable breach
of fiduciary duty claim.
III. DETERMINATION OF TRUST SITUS
A.

Role of Trust Situs

Trusts are particularly likely to have interstate implications, because
of the length of time a trust can last and the number of relevant contacts,
such as the domiciles of the interested parties and the location of the
trust assets. While the settlor and the trustee may be relatively stable
geographically, the initial beneficiaries are frequently residents of other
states either at the commencement of the trust or later during the trust
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

H.B. 1051 § 12(2).
S.B. 5344 § 16(2)(b)
Id. § 16(5).
This is the effective date of the 2011 Legislation.
This is the effective date of the 2013 Legislation.
See supra Part II.A.
In re Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wash. App. 751, 761, 911 P.2d 1017, 1023 (1996).
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term, and subsequent beneficiaries are even more likely to reside in other
states. The location of trust assets has become more problematic in the
digital age. The situs of real property is easily ascertained, but rules of
thumb in determining the situs of personalty, such as the location of a
stock certificate, 176 are useless in a paperless financial system. Courts
and statutes often attempt to resolve issues regarding multistate trusts by
identifying a “domicile” for the trust, called the trust situs.177
Determination of a trust’s situs is usually dependent on the “principal
place of administration,” 178 which is often determined with reference to
the place where the books and records of the trust are kept. 179 Trust situs
and the principal place of administration are outmoded concepts as
trustees are often national banks or trust companies and records are
stored in the cloud. The UTC drafters declined to define principal place
of administration “[b]ecause of the difficult and variable situations
sometimes involved.” 180
Nevertheless, identifying one state as the situs of a trust remains
relevant for several reasons. The first reason is determining whether a
trust is subject to a state’s income tax. This determination, however, is
made by the taxing state and another state’s claim of situs would not
limit the ability of the taxing state to assess tax against the trust. 181 The
only limitation on the taxing state is constitutional. The U.S. Supreme
Court has stated that “due process requires some definite link, some
minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax.” 182 While there has been no U.S. Supreme
Court decision on what connections are necessary to allow a state to tax
a trust, several state courts have ruled on the issue. 183 Most recently, in
176. For example, Facebook and Microsoft are two corporations that do not issue paper stock
certificates, and physical stock certificates are becoming extremely rare.
177. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 554A-8 (West 2006) (“Except as specifically provided in
the trust, the provisions in this chapter shall apply to any trust with a situs in Hawaii, whenever
established.”).
178. JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE GUIDE TO TRUSTS AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION
§ 17.04[C] (2009).
179. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7209 (West 2013); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.96A.030(7) (2010), amended by 2011 Wash. Sess. Laws 2102, 2108.
180. U.T.C. § 108 cmt. (2010).
181. See In re Dorrance’s Estate, 163 A. 303, 311 (Pa. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932);
see also In re Dorrance’s Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff’d, 189 A. 639 (N.J.
Ch. 1937), aff’d, 184 A. 743 (N.J. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936).
182. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1953).
183. E.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782 (Conn. 1999); Dist. of Columbia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997); Blue v. Dep’t of Treasury, 462 N.W.2d 762
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Swift v. Dir. of Revenue (In re Swift), 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987).
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Trust for McNeil v. Commonwealth 184 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court held that taxing a trust located in Delaware solely on the basis that
the grantor was a Pennsylvania resident when the trust was established
in 1959 was not constitutional under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 185 Because a Washington statute cannot affect another
state’s determination of the ability to tax a trust, the issue of state tax is
not addressed in in this Article. 186
The two remaining issues that are relevant to trust situs are
jurisdiction and choice of law. The identification of the situs of a trust is
not necessarily determinative on these issues but trust situs is a
significant factor. With respect to jurisdiction, when controversies arise
regarding a trust with multistate contacts, the proper forum has to be
determined. If the issue involves real property held in the trust, then the
court of the state where the land is located unquestionably has in rem
jurisdiction. 187 A controversy involving personalty or pertaining to the
relationship between the trustee and beneficiary will be more
problematic. Even if the settlor has established trust situs in one state,
that state does not necessarily have exclusive jurisdiction. For example,
in McElroy v. McElroy, 188 the California Supreme Court stated:
Ordinarily the beneficiary of a trust may enforce his rights by
proceeding either against the trust property or against the trustee
personally . . . . Where, as in this case, the proceeding is brought
to enforce the trustees’ obligation, and the judgment does not
undertake to operate directly on the corpus of the trust, the
court’s power to act is based upon jurisdiction over the trustees
and not upon the location of the trust res. 189
The leading case on trust jurisdiction is Hanson v. Denckla. 190 The
trust in question had been established in Delaware by a Pennsylvania
woman, and the trustee was a Delaware trust company. 191 It was a
revocable trust where the trustor was the income beneficiary and upon
her death the remaining trust assets were to be distributed to whomever
184. 67 A.3d 185, 195 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
185. Id. at 198.
186. See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, at tbl.11-54 (2009) (providing a chart of the contacts that
will result in subjecting a trust to tax in the individual states).
187. VA AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 646, at 510–11
(4th ed. 1987).
188. 198 P.2d 683, 684 (Cal. 1948).
189. Id.; see also In re Probyn, 99 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
190. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
191. Id. at 238.
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she appointed by will or by lifetime instrument, or to her issue if she did
not exercise the power of appointment. She moved to Florida and
exercised the power of appointment. When she died, two of her
daughters challenged the validity of the power of appointment in Florida
court, and the Florida court held it was invalid under Florida law. 192 The
executor of her estate brought an action in Delaware to determine the
validity of the exercise of the power of appointment, and the Delaware
court held that it was not bound by the Florida decision and that the
exercise of the power of appointment was valid. 193 The U.S. Supreme
Court held that the Florida judgment was void because, under Florida
law, the trustee was an indispensable party and the Florida court did not
have personal jurisdiction over the Delaware trust company. 194 The
Delaware trust company’s sole contact with Florida was passive, in that
their existing client had moved to that state, and that was not sufficient
to assert personal jurisdiction. 195 The majority opinion, however,
indicated that the Florida court could have rendered a valid judgment as
to controversies between the beneficiaries that were subject to the
Florida court’s jurisdiction. 196 The scope of such a judgment is
problematic because it would not bind the trustee or other beneficiaries.
In Rose v. Firstar Bank, 197 there was a similar issue of whether the
Rhode Island beneficiaries of a trust established in Ohio could sue the
Ohio bank serving as trustee in Rhode Island. The trust had been set up
under the will of an Ohio resident. The Ohio trustee had administered
the trust out of its Cincinnati office and had regularly submitted
accountings for approval to the Ohio court. The beneficiaries moved to
Rhode Island after the trust was established, and the trustee
communicated with the beneficiaries in Rhode Island, sending
statements, distributions and other documents. The trustee had no other
contact with Rhode Island. 198 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that, similar to the trustee in Hanson v. Denckla, the fact that a
beneficiary moves to a state does not create personal jurisdiction in that
state over the trustee. 199 In contrast, in Nile v. Nile, 200 the Massachusetts
192. Id. at 243–44.
193. Lewis v. Hanson, 128 A.2d 819, 835 (Del. 1957).
194. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958).
195. The trust company in question, Wilmington Trust Company, now has several offices in
Florida so the court could exert general jurisdiction over Wilmington.
196. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254.
197. 819 A.2d 1247 (R.I. 2003).
198. Id. at 1251.
199. Id. at 1252–53. The court noted the irony of the beneficiaries’ claim of personal jurisdiction
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court distinguished Hanson v. Denckla and asserted personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident successor trustee. The court justified Massachusetts
jurisdiction because the trust had been established as a revocable trust
and the settlor was the trustee until his death, and the settlor had
sufficient contacts with Massachusetts so that “jurisdiction extends to
the trustees as his personal representatives.” 201
In Walton v. Harris, 202 the trust was established in Massachusetts,
with Massachusetts trustees. A beneficiary of the trust (the trustor’s
daughter) moved to Florida, and her share of the trust was separated
from the other share and an Illinois resident was appointed as trustee. 203
The Illinois trustee resigned and was replaced by a Florida trustee. The
trust beneficiary’s daughter, who was a secondary beneficiary of the
trust, sued the Illinois and Florida trustees in Massachusetts state court.
The court held that Massachusetts had jurisdiction over the Illinois and
Florida trustees because the settlor intended the trust to be a
Massachusetts trust and even though administration had moved to
Florida, “[t]he situs of the daughter’s trust remains in the
Commonwealth.” 204 In United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 205 the issue
was whether the Connecticut court had jurisdiction over nonresident
trust beneficiaries in an action filed by the trustee for approval of its
final accounting. The trust had been established by Connecticut residents
and had a Connecticut choice of law provision, but was being
administered in New York by a New York trustee. 206 The beneficiaries
were residents of Texas. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the beneficiaries was
constitutional because they “should reasonably have foreseen being
hailed into [Connecticut] court to defend this case. They held their
interest in the trust under the terms of a trust agreement that had been
executed by Connecticut residents.” 207
The UTC and the Uniform Probate Code both have provisions that
give jurisdiction over the trustee and beneficiaries to the courts in the
in light of their substantive claims that included allegations of unresponsiveness and insufficient
communication.
200. 734 N.E.2d 1153 (Mass. 2000).
201. Id. at 1158.
202. 647 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
203. Id. at 67.
204. Id. at 69.
205. 495 A.2d 1034 (Conn. 1985).
206. Id. at 1037.
207. Id. at 1040.
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state that is the “principal place of administration” even though that term
is not defined in either statute.208
Jurisdiction over the parties and the trust can therefore turn on
determination of the trust situs, coupled with other factors. Trust situs
can also aid a court in asserting jurisdiction over the trust when all
parties want a matter heard in a particular state court. For example, in In
re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 209 the beneficiaries and two of the
trustees of a number of related trusts petitioned the Delaware court to
remove a corporate trustee, appoint a Delaware trust company as trustee,
change the situs of the trust to Delaware and establish that Delaware law
governs the trust administration. 210 The petitioners wanted to convert the
trusts to directed trusts, 211 allowed under Delaware law but not under
New York law, which was the choice of law made by the trust
agreement. The court denied the petition, upholding the choice of law
made in the trust agreement. The court also noted that “moving the situs
or place of administration of a trust from one state to another does not
automatically result in a change in the law that applies.” 212 A Delaware
statute provided “[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by the terms
of a governing instrument or by court order, the laws of this State shall
govern the administration of a trust while the trust is administered in this
State” 213 and the petitioners asserted that appointing a Delaware trustee
would trigger application of Delaware law. The choice of New York law
in the trust agreement overrode this provision. Even if it had not, the
court noted that because the proposed directed trust reformation would
strip the Delaware trust company of most substantive decisions and
allocate those duties to nonresidents, there were “serious questions”
whether the trust would actually be administered in Delaware. The
Peierls Trusts case illustrates that moving trusts to take advantage of
more favorable laws in another state can be difficult and the notions of
situs and administration play an important role.
Choice of law is only somewhat dependent on a determination of a
trust’s situs, but can turn on a determination of trust situs or its sister

208. U.T.C. § 202 (2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-103 (amended 1993).
209. 59 A.3d 471 (Del. Ch. 2012).
210. Id. at 474.
211. Directed trusts, authorized in about thirty states, allow a trust document to delegate
responsibilities to a third party, such as investment decisions that are normally responsibilities of the
trustee. See Arden Dale, Estate Plans with Reins, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122126441328630621.html.
212. In re Peierls, 59 A.3d at 483 (emphasis in original).
213. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 332(b) (2007).
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concept, principal place of administration. Choice of law in trust matters
depends on a number of factors, such as whether the trust property is real
property or personalty, whether the trust is testamentary or inter vivos,
and what issue needs resolution, such as the validity, construction, or
administration of the trust. 214 Traditionally, the law of place of trust
administration would determine whether the trust is valid. 215 Some
courts refer to the law of the situs of the trust as controlling without
specifying how that would be identified. 216
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws recommends the law
of the state with the most significant relationship, which again points to
state of trust administration. 217 The state of trust administration is
determined by settlor intent, and the trustee’s principal place of trust
business is one of the factors indicating where the settlor intended.218 For
trust administration issues, the Restatement would choose the state
where the trust administration is “most substantially related,” 219 unless
the trust agreement has a governing law clause. The UTC has a choice of
law provision based on the Restatement approach, and “[u]sually, the
law of the trust’s principal place of administration will govern
administrative matters and the law of the place having the most
significant relationship to the trust’s creation will govern the dispositive
provisions.” 220
An unpublished case in Kansas illustrates the various factors that
courts consider when applying the UTC standard of governing law and
determining a trust’s principal place of administration. The Kansas
appellate court held that the “principal place of administration” of a trust
was in Kansas because (1) the trust was revocable initially and had been
created in Kansas by a then-Kansas resident; (2) the decedent’s will was
probated in Kansas; (3) the decedent’s spouse was a resident of Kansas;
(4) the trustee was a Kansas resident (and not yet an Oklahoma resident)
when the trust’s legal issues began; and (5) the trustee had previously
submitted to jurisdiction in Kansas by answering and making a
214. See Jeffrey Schoenblum, Governing Law Clauses for Trusts, in 44TH ANNUAL PHILLIP E.
HECKERLING INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING § 1405 (2009).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 270, reporter’s note (1959).
216. See, e.g., Warner v. Fla. Bank & Trust, 160 F.2d 766, 773 (5th Cir. 1947) (“Matters of
administration are determined by the law of the situs or the seat of the trust, and the domicile of the
trustee of intangible personal property including shares of stock is usually the seat of the trust.”);
Comm’r v. Brown, 122 F.2d 800, 802 (3d Cir. 1941).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 cmt. c (1971).
218. Id. § 267 cmt. c.
219. Id. § 272 cmt. d.
220. U.T.C. § 107 cmt. (2010).
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counterclaim in the case. 221 Because the testator had designated Kansas
as the governing law of the trust, under the Kansas Uniform Trust Code
the most important factual question in determining whether Kansas law
applied was whether another state had a more significant relationship to
the trust. 222 The factors described above, taken together, outweighed the
trust’s connection to Texas, which was where the decedent died, and to
Oklahoma, which was where the trustee lived and maintained contact
with the broker for the sole trust asset, an IRA. 223
Choice of law therefore is made based on several factors, but those
factors can rely on the outmoded and vague concepts of situs and
principal place of administration. Identifying one place of administration
can be problematic, as seen in the Peierls Trusts case, where under
modern configurations of directed trusts, decision-making can occur in
several different states. Although choice of law may seem to be less of a
concern in trust issues because of the relative uniformity of state laws in
the area, 224 significant variations in underlying issues, such as the
definition of family, remain. For example, a trust established by a
domiciliary of one state that provides for a beneficiary’s spouse may
raise choice of law issues if the beneficiary’s marriage to his same-sex
spouse is valid in his state of residence but not recognized in the
trustor’s state of domicile.
Issues of jurisdiction and choice of law for multistate trusts are too
complex to be fully addressed here, 225 but in resolving both questions,
courts often attempt to define one home state for the trust. The UTC
continues that approach with its focus on “principal place of
administration,” which controls jurisdiction over the trust and its
parties. 226 As noted by Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum227 in his discussion
of what he calls “the elusive meaning of trust situs,” “[l]ayering one
undefined and misunderstood phrase on top of another in the process of
resolving choice of law controversy is not likely to lead to a rational and
predictable set of outcomes.” 228

221. Commerce Bank v. Bolander, No. 94,569, 2007 WL 1041760, at *1–13 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr.
6, 2007).
222. Id. at *4, *6.
223. Id. at *5.
224. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, § 553 (noting that a number of states that have
enacted the UTC).
225. See generally id. ch. 14.
226. U.T.C. § 202 (2010).
227. Centennial Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law.
228. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, § 17.041[C], at 17–55.
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Prior Washington Law

Under prior Washington law, a trust had a situs in Washington if the
trust document so provided, or if the trust was silent, if the “principal
place of administration” of the trust was in Washington. 229 The principal
place of administration of a trust was the trustee’s “usual place of
business where the day-to-day [trust records] are kept, or the trustee’s
residence if the trustee has no such place of business.” 230 No case law in
Washington provided any further description of a trust’s “principal place
of administration.” The consequences of identifying Washington as the
situs of the trust, as recognized by the prior statutes, were limited to
determining venue 231 and triggering the change of situs provisions of
RCW 11.96A.045. Although there is no reported case law, presumably
the classification of Washington as the trust situs would gain access to
Washington courts and the application of Washington law.
C.

Situs Under Washington’s New Law

When the 2003 Task Force considered the issue, it realized that at the
very least Washington’s out-of-date references to where the trust books
and records are kept had to be removed. It acknowledged the difficulties
recognized by the UTC drafters, but decided that a clear method to
establish Washington situs was critical. In particular, Task Force
members raised situations where interested parties had connections to
Washington and wanted to take advantage of Washington’s liberal
statutes allowing nonjudicial agreements to modify trusts. The Task
Force recognized that the current reality of multistate contacts had
already created the potential for a trust to have multiple states as situs,
giving multiple states’ courts’ jurisdiction to hear disputes (assuming
personal jurisdiction issues are resolved), and creating complex choice
of law issues. Because this situation already existed, the Task Force
decided the statutory approach should be to allow a trust’s interested
parties to assert Washington as the situs as long as there was a
Washington connection. With such a statute, if the parties are in
agreement then Washington jurisdiction and choice of law would be
enforced, and the controversy when parties to a trust did not agree would
not be substantially changed from the existing uncertainty in any

229. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.030(9) (2011).
230. Id. § 11.96A.030(7).
231. Id. § 11.96A.050(1); Carnevali v. Carnevali, No. 57032-3-I, 2006 WL 2113263 (Wash. Ct.
App. July 31, 2006).
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controversy involving multiple states.
The 2003 Task Force used a Pennsylvania statute 232 as a model.
Pennsylvania adopted the UTC in 2006, but replaced UTC section 108
with this statute. It provides that a trust situs designated in a trust
agreement is valid if there is a specified connection with the selected
situs. 233 The statute combines the notion of situs with the identification
of the county where venue is proper, and refers to situs in a particular
county. If there is no choice in the trust agreement, then the statute
distinguishes between testamentary trusts and living trusts. Testamentary
trusts have a situs in the county where letters were granted to the
personal representative of the estate and where letters might have been
granted if no letters were granted. If no letters could have been granted,
testamentary trusts may have situs in any county where any trustee lives
or does business. For a living trust, if the settlor is still alive and was a
Pennsylvania resident either when the trust became irrevocable or when
a petition is filed with the court, if the trust is still revocable, situs is
either the county of the settlor’s principal residence or where any of the
trustees live or do business. After the domiciliary settlor of a living trust
dies, situs can be in any county where a trustee lives or does business. 234
If the settlor of a living trust is not a Pennsylvania domiciliary, then situs
can be a county where a trustee has a principal place of business or is a
resident, where all or part of the trust administration occurs, or where
one or more of the beneficiaries reside. 235 Although the statute refers to
counties, it is used as a basis to give jurisdiction to a Pennsylvania
court. 236 The statute has been criticized for creating the potential for
more than one situs, 237 but that potential exists even without a statute
when the standards of establishing situs are so vague.
The 2003 Task Force determined that leaving the issue of situs
undefined not only left the current uncertainty in place but also created
problems for trust beneficiaries and trustees who agreed on the desired
situs but were uncertain as to how to establish that situs. Establishing

232. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7708 (West Supp. 2013).
233. Id. Connections sufficient to validate a choice of situs include the residence or principal
place of business of a trustee, the occurrence of all or a part of the trust administration, or the
residence of one or more of the beneficiaries.
234. Id. § 7708(2).
235. Id. § 7708(3).
236. E.g., In re Trust of Pennington, 219 A.2d 353 (Pa. 1966) (Pennsylvania court properly
exercised jurisdiction over trust accounting by Pennsylvania bank which was trustee of inter vivos
trust created by settlor who was a New Jersey resident); SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178, at 17–42.
237. SCHOENBLUM, supra note 178 at 17–42.
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trust situs not only aids in jurisdiction but can also affect choice of
law. 238 Also, if a statute defined situs, protection can be provided for
parties who would be prejudiced by the assertion of jurisdiction in a
particular state. It began with the Pennsylvania statute as a model but
expanded the procedure and clarified that the provisions related to the
trust’s relationship with the state of Washington rather than specific
counties.
Washington’s new statute regarding situs is applicable to all trusts,
regardless of the date of execution of the trust. 239 There are now various
ways for a trust to qualify for Washington situs, all of which are
dependent upon the language in the trust document, the type of trust, and
the location of beneficiaries, the trustee, the trustor, and trust real
property.
The first way to qualify for Washington situs is where the trust
document designates Washington as the trust’s situs or Washington law
as the governing law of the trust. If this is the case, then only one
connection to Washington is required to establish Washington situs. 240
The requirement of a connection is satisfied where the trust possesses
one of several allowable connections to Washington: (1) a resident
trustee or a trustee with a place of business in Washington; (2) more than
an insignificant aspect of trust administration occurring in Washington;
(3) a resident trustor at the creation of the trust or at the time the trust
became irrevocable; (4) at least one resident qualified beneficiary; or (5)
Washington real property as an asset. 241
If the trust document does not designate Washington as the trust’s
situs or Washington law as the governing law of the trust, then the
trustee may qualify for Washington situs by registering the trust as a
Washington trust, but only if one of the above-described connections
exists. 242 Registration of the trust includes filing a statement with the
clerk of the appropriate Washington county. 243 The appropriate county
for filing includes several possibilities: (1) if the trust is a testamentary
trust, the county where the will is being administered or was completed;

238. Id. at 17–42 n.180 (recommending that a trustee “take affirmative steps to establish
unambiguously a trust situs of administration in a state such as California [that does not require
court supervision of testamentary trusts]”).
239. H.B. 1051, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40 (Wash. 2011).
240. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.005(1) (2012).
241. Id. This list is similar to but modified from the list of connections in the Pennsylvania
statute.
242. Id. § 11.98.005(2).
243. Id.
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(2) the county where a qualified beneficiary resides; (3) the county
where the trustee resides or has a place of business; or (4) the county
where a real property asset is located. 244 The statement must include the
contact information for the trustee, the date of the trust, the name of the
trustor, the name of the trust, and the applicable “connection”
requirement. 245 Within five days from filing the statement, the trustee
must deliver notice of the filing to each qualified beneficiary. 246 The
notice affords each recipient the opportunity to object to the registration
as a Washington trust. 247 If no recipient objects to the registration within
thirty days from the initial filing of the statement, then such registration
is deemed the equivalent of an order entered by a court declaring that the
situs of the trust is Washington. 248
If the trust document does not designate Washington as the trust’s
situs or Washington law as the governing law of the trust, and if the
trustee does not register the trust as a Washington trust, then a trust may
still qualify for a Washington situs if the situs has not been already
determined by judicial proceeding in another jurisdiction, and if
additional certain requirements are met, depending upon the type of
trust.
If the trust is a testamentary trust, the situs is Washington if the
trustor’s will was admitted to probate in Washington, or if no probate
occurred, either (1) a qualified beneficiary resides in Washington, (2) the
trustee resides in or has a place of business in Washington, or (3)
Washington real property is held in the trust. 249
If the trust is an inter vivos irrevocable trust and the trustor is still
living, then the situs is Washington if Washington is the trustor’s
domicile or a trustee resides in or has a place of business in
Washington. 250 This provision is modeled on the Pennsylvania statute
but varies in that the situs can be established while the trust is still
revocable without having to initiate a court proceeding. This is important
in Washington because it allows the interested parties to qualify for
Washington situs and use the Washington nonjudicial agreement
procedures. 251
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. § 11.96A.050.
Id. § 11.98.005(2)(a).
Id. § 11.98.005(2)(b).
Id.
Id. § 11.98.005(2)(c).
Id. § 11.98.005(3)(a).
See id. § 11.98.005(3)(b)(i).
Id. § 11.96A.220. The situs provision was amended in the 2013 Legislation to clarify this
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If the trust is an inter vivos trust and the trustor is deceased, then the
situs is Washington if the trustor was domiciled in Washington at the
time the trust became irrevocable and one of several requirments is
satisfied: (1) the trustor’s will was admitted to probate in Washington;
(2) a qualified beneficiary resides in Washington; (3) a trustee resides in
or has a place of business in Washington; or (4) Washington real
property is an asset of the trust. 252
If the situs of a trust is not determined under any of the abovedescribed methods, then its situs may be determined judicially, but not
by a non-judicial binding agreement. 253 The trustee may petition the
superior court of the appropriate county, which may be one of several
options: (1) the county where a qualified beneficiary resides; (2) the
county where the trustee resides or has a place of business; or (3) the
county where a real property asset is located. 254 In the petition, the
trustee must assert that the trust has met at least one of the connection
requirements described above. 255 For the purposes of the judicial
proceeding, the procedural rules of RCW 11.96A.080–200 must be
followed, which essentially requires that the trustee provide service of a
summons and a copy of the filed petition to all parties with an interest in
the trust and in the determination of situs for the trust.256
In essence, the statutory scheme created by the 2003 Task Force
allows situs to be designated in order of priority. First, the trustor can
select situs as Washington, as long as there is a Washington connection.
Second, if the trustor has not designated situs, the trustee can choose
Washington as the situs by registering the trust, subject to having a
Washington connection and subject to any objections raised by the
beneficiaries. If neither the trustor nor the trustee has established
Washington as the trust situs, then situs can be established under certain
fact patterns, and if none of those fact patterns apply, the court can
choose Washington as trust situs, as long as there is a Washington
connection.
The 2003 Task Force recognized that this was an innovative approach
to situs. It expands on Pennsylvania’s liberal approach by allowing the
trustee to select situs, and in default of prior methods, allowing a court to
impose Washington situs. The philosophy was to open Washington
point. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 9 (Wash. 2013).
252. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.005(3)(b)(ii) (West 2013).
253. Id. § 11.98.005(3)(c).
254. Id. § 11.96A.050.
255. Id.
256. Id. § 11.96A.100.
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courts and the application of Washington law to all trusts with a
Washington connection. It does not resolve the problem of competing
claims of situs where the parties disagree, but that problem exists
independently of the statute and is likely unresolvable in light of the
multistate nature of current trust business and the expansion of
jurisdiction and choice of law considerations. The statute does give a
level of certainty to parties who agree on Washington as the appropriate
situs and gives parties who are in disagreement specific tests of trust
situs and an opportunity for judicial resolution. Ultimately, the 2003
Task Force believed that multiple possibilities of trust situs is inevitable
and growing, and that the law should, instead of clinging to the outdated
idea that a trust is an entity with one home, recognize that a trust is a
web of relationships, jurisdiction should be expansive and choice of law
should focus on the interests at stake.
IV. REPRESENTATION
In some circumstances, the common law allows living competent
persons who are interested in a trust or estate to represent other relevant
parties with similar interests. This concept, which includes the doctrine
of virtual representation, limits the number of necessary parties when
resolving disputes, and is a tremendous benefit to parties wishing to
avail themselves of Washington’s nonjudicial trust and estate dispute
resolution process. 257 Washington codified portions of the common law
of virtual representation in the 1984 Act, and has subsequently amended
those provisions. The UTC included codification of representation as
well. The scope of the Washington and UTC provisions vary, however.
This section describes the various scenarios where representation can be
used, discusses the evolution of the Washington provisions, compares
Washington provisions with the UTC, and identifies some remaining
interpretive issues with the Washington statute. This section also
proposes an amendment to the Washington statute for further
clarification.
A.

General Overview
Representation allows for a living person to act on behalf of another

257. Id. § 11.96A.220; see Bruce P. Flynn et al., Nonjudicial Dispute Resolution Agreements in
Trusts and Estates—The Washington Experience and a Proposed Act, 20 ACTEC NOTES 138, 140
(Spring 1994) (“[Virtual representation] can greatly streamline the process by eliminating the
procedural complexities involved in appointing guardians and guardians ad litem, and can
significantly reduce costs.”).

05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

858

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

10/10/2013 10:31 AM

[Vol. 88:813

individual or a potentially interested party in a dispute or non-judicial
matter, such as by receiving notice or giving consent on behalf of the
represented party. There are generally three different categories of
representation, namely, virtual representation, fiduciary representation,
and court-appointed representation. 258 Virtual representation permits, in
certain situations, living beneficiaries to represent unborn, minor, or
unascertained future beneficiaries, and in some cases, living, adult
beneficiaries who have interests in the trust similar to the interests of the
person representing them. 259 Fiduciary representation permits, in certain
situations, trustees or personal representatives to represent beneficiaries,
guardians to represent wards, and attorneys-in-fact to represent
principals. Court-appointed representation permits a guardian ad litem or
another third-party representative appointed by the court to represent
specific beneficiaries for specific purposes.
Virtual representatives do not owe fiduciary duties to their
represented parties and are not subject to court review. There is no
liability ascribed to a virtual representative if, after binding action is
taken by the representative, the represented party does not like or
approve of the result. 260 The concept behind virtual representation has
always been that the representing party’s self-interested involvement
will adequately represent the interests of the represented party, as long as
their interests in the matter align. 261 Instead of imposing liability on the
representative, the virtual representation is generally inapplicable if the
interest represented was not sufficiently protected. 262 Whether virtual
representation is adequate rests upon whether the representative acted in
“hostility to the interest” of the person represented. 263 Hostility can be
shown by the representative’s affirmative conduct demonstrating
adversity to the represented party’s interests.264 The more modern
interpretation of “hostility” in the context of virtual representation is the
existence of a conflict of the economic interests of the representative and

258. See, e.g., U.T.C. Art. III; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 181–86 (1936).
259. A classic example of virtual representation is: a trust is established for Ann for life,
remainder to Ann’s children, but if any of Ann’s children die before her, leaving children, then the
children of the deceased child would take their parent’s share. Ann has one son, Tom. Tom can
virtually represent his children’s contingent interests in the trust because Tom’s children’s interest is
the same as Tom’s.
260. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 185 cmt. b.
261. Id. §§ 181, 183, 185 cmt. c .
262. Id. § 185 cmt. e.
263. Id.
264. Id. § 185 cmt. d.
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the represented party. 265 The disqualifying hostility (or conflict) is
normally to be determined at the time that representation would
otherwise occur, since the use of virtual representation is essentially a
jurisdictional concept.266 It is therefore imperative that the determination
of whether a conflict exists between the representative and the
represented party or parties be made to ensure that the representation is
effective and correspondingly, that the resolution of the dispute is
binding, or the delivery of notice or information is proper.
Liability in the context of fiduciary representation and courtappointed representation is different. Representation by a fiduciary is
subject to the principles of fiduciary law. Therefore, when acting as a
representative, such a fiduciary must meet fiduciary standards of care, or
risk suit for breach of fiduciary duty by or on behalf of the principal. 267
Liability in the context of court-appointed representatives is also
different because they are subject to court review, 268 and are appointed
with specific powers according to statutory schemes which may provide
for liability (or a release therefrom).
B.

Prior Washington Law

1.

Fiduciary Representation

While not specifically codified in Washington, Washington law has
permitted representation of persons by their fiduciaries through either
the application of the common law or through other chapters of
RCW Title 11. Depending on the scope and type of fiduciary
relationship, fiduciaries have the general duty to administer or manage
assets and affairs for the benefit of the persons they represent. 269 For
example, a personal representative is charged with the duty to administer
the estate for the benefit of the estate beneficiaries. 270 In doing so, the
personal representative may act as the representative for the estate’s
beneficiaries, in the context of the collection and management of estate

265. Martin D. Begleiter, Serve the Cheerleader—Serve the World: An Analysis of
Representation in Estate and Trust Proceedings and Under the Uniform Trust Code and other
Modern Trust Codes, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 311, 326, 337–38 (2008).
266. Id. at 375.
267. Id. at 359–63.
268. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070(3) (2012).
269. See, e.g., id. § 11.48.010.
270. Id. § 11.48.010; In re Estate of Larson, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985); In re
Winslow’s Estate, 30 Wash. App. 575, 636 P.2d 505 (1981).
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assets 271 or acting as a party in a lawsuit on behalf of the estate. 272 In
addition, a guardian of the estate and guardian of the person of an
incapacitated person has the ability to stand in the shoes of the
incapacitated person, and, with court oversight, manage their assets and
their health and welfare. 273 Further, a principal has always had the ability
to grant an attorney-in-fact any number and types of powers to act on his
or her behalf. 274
2.

Court-Appointed Representation

Washington law has always recognized the ability to have a courtappointed guardian ad litem to represent the interests of a party when
necessary. 275 However, the adoption of the 1984 Act added the ability to
appoint a “special representative” to represent beneficiaries of trusts and
estates in disputes where the trust or estate beneficiaries are minors,
incapacitated, unborn, or unascertained. 276 The “special representative”
may be appointed by the court upon the request of the trustee or personal
representative involved in a dispute that is subject to resolution under
RCW 11.96A. 277 The special representative is unique in that he or she
may only enter into a non-judicial binding agreement on behalf of the
represented party under RCW 11.96A, and may not represent a party in
the context of an active litigation dispute for which a guardian ad litem
would traditionally serve. 278 The “special representative” is required to
be an individual with specialized training in trusts and estates matters,
and may be used instead of the traditionally court-appointed guardian ad
litem. While the special representative is appointed by the court, the
decisions made by the special representative are not subject to the
review of the court unless the special representative specifically requests
such review in the context of a release from serving. 279 However, the
271. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.48.020. See generally id. § 11.48.
272. See, e.g., Griffith v. James, 91 Wash. 607, 158 P. 251 (1916).
273. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.060. See generally id. §§ 11.88, 11.92.
274. See, for example, RCW 11.94.050, where if the principal does not enumerate specific
powers, but creates a general durable power of attorney, the attorney-in-fact has “all powers of
absolute ownership of the principal” except certain estate planning related powers. See generally
§ 11.94.
275. See §§ 11.88.090, 11.96A.160, 4.08.050, 4.08.060.
276. This section has been restated and moved to RCW chapter 11.96A (2012). Id. § 11.96A.250
(original version at ch. 149, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws § 61, 648, 681–82 (originally codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.170 (1985))).
277. Id. § 11.96A.250.
278. Id.
279. Id. § 11.96A.240.
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authority of a court appointed guardian ad litem may supersede that of a
special representative. 280
3.

Virtual Representation

Virtual representation was first codified in Washington in the 1984
Act 281 and was then restated and moved to the new RCW 11.96A in
1999, as part of the Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act
(TEDRA). 282 The comments to the 1984 Act and of the TEDRA drafting
committee explain the adoption of the virtual representation section as
supplemental to the common law, stating specifically:
This enactment is meant to be supplemental to the common law
doctrine. This enactment is not intended to prevent the
application of the common law doctrine.
This section and the Doctrine of Virtual Representation provide
rules that simplify the requirements for notifying the possible
beneficiaries of future interests, particularly unborn and
uncertain beneficiaries. See Restatement of the Law of Property,
sections 180-186 (1936). 283
Virtual representation was a critical part of an innovation introduced
in Washington’s 1984 Trust Act, allowing parties interested in a trust or
estate to resolve issues nonjudicially. 284 Traditionally, resolution of these
types of issues required court proceedings and the appointment of a
guardian ad litem to represent the interests of minor, unborn, and
unascertained beneficiaries. 285 In order to reduce court congestion and
save time and money for the interested parties, the 1984 Trust Act
authorized the use of nonjudicial binding agreements among all
interested parties. 286 If the agreement or a memorandum of the
280. Id. § 11.96A.160(2).
281. Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (originally codified at
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.110 (1985)).
282. Ch. 42, sec. 305, 1999 Wash. Sess. Laws 177, 185–86 (codified as amended at WASH. REV.
CODE § 11.96A.120 (2012)).
283. REAL PROP., PROBATE, & TRUST SECTION, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, Comments to the
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act, WSBARPPT.COM, http://www.wsbarppt.com/
comments/tedra99.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) [hereinafter TEDRA Comments].
284. Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (current version at WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 11.96A.120, 11.96A.220 (2012)); TRUST TASK FORCE, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N,
Comments on the 1984 Revision of the Washington Trust Act, WSBARPPT.COM, available at
http://www.wsbarppt.com/comments/tra85.pdf (see section sixty-one, discussing RCW 11.96.170).
285. Flynn et al., supra note 257, at 138.
286. See Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110, 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 680 (current version at
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.96A.120, 11.96A.220 (2012)).
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agreement is filed with the court, then the agreement has the force of a
court order. 287 In order for these nonjudicial agreements to bind all
parties, minor, unborn, and unascertainable parties had to have
representation. That issue was resolved by the use of virtual
representation when available, and if not available, by the appointment
of a special representative to represent the parties unable to represent
themselves. 288
As codified in Washington, there have historically been three
permissible types of virtual representation of trust beneficiaries by other
trust beneficiaries. The first type is “horizontal” virtual representation,
which allows for a living adult member of a class of beneficiaries to
represent all unborn or unascertainable members of the same class. 289
For example, a trustor creates a trust that provides a lifetime income
interest to his spouse, and after his spouse’s death, the remainder passes
equally to his then living children. The devise to his “then living
children” is a class gift in trust. If the trustor has only one living adult
child at the time that representation is determined, then that child may
virtually represent all of the yet unborn children of the trustor. In the
context of horizontal representation, no living, competent, adult
beneficiaries can be virtually represented. This subsection was
essentially a codification of common law representation of unborn
persons. 290
The second type is “vertical” virtual representation of the future
beneficiaries of an interest in trust where the future beneficiaries bear
some relation to the beneficiary who would be the representative. 291
Virtual representation, in this case by a current trust beneficiary, requires
that the represented parties be a surviving spouse or domestic partner,
distributee, heir, issue, or other kindred of the beneficiary. In all cases
representation may occur only if those future beneficiaries who are being
represented have the “same interest” in the trust as the initial beneficiary
who is to act as the representative. 292 For example, a trustor creates a
trust giving a lifetime income interest in trust to his child, and at his

287. See Ch. 149, sec. 61, §11.96.170(4), 1984 Wash. Sess. Laws 648, 682 (current version at
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.230); see also Flynn et al., supra note 257, at 142.
288. Flynn,et al., supra note 257, at 141.
289. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(a); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(1), 1984 Wash.
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(b) (Wash. 2013).
290. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 183 (1936).
291. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(2), 1984 Wash.
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344 § 5(7).
292. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b).
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child’s death, his child’s spouse will also have a lifetime income interest
in trust. At the death of the child’s spouse, the remainder in trust will
pass to the then living children of the child and his spouse. Assume that
the trustor’s child and the child’s spouse are both alive, and that they
have two adult children. The trustor’s child can virtually represent his
spouse because they both have the same lifetime income interest in the
trust. The trustor’s child cannot virtually represent his living, adult
children because their interests differ: the child has a lifetime income
interest, but the children have a vested remainder interest. Note that
through the use of this section, a living, competent adult may be virtually
represented. This subsection was a codification of a common law rule of
virtual representation. 293
The third type is “vertical” virtual representation of successive future
interests, without any requirement that the represented party have a
particular relationship to the representative. Virtual representation in this
case allows current living contingent remainder beneficiaries (or a living
member of the class of contingent remainder beneficiaries) to represent
future successive contingent remainder beneficiaries who take the “same
interest” in trust upon a successive future event. 294 For example, a trustor
creates a trust that provides a lifetime income interest to his spouse, and
after his spouse’s death, the remainder passes equally to his then living
children. If he has no then living children, then the remainder passes
equally to his sibling’s then living children. If no such children are then
living, the remainder passes to a charity. Through the use of this
subsection, the living, competent adults who are children of the trustor’s
siblings can represent the interests of the charity. This subsection goes
beyond what was contemplated by common law, which traditionally
only permitted representation of living persons if their interest was
created by indefinite language, such as “heirs,” “next of kin,” or
“surviving spouse.” 295 This subsection followed a modern trend which
started with the enactment of a similar broad statute in New York in
1967. 296

293. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §181(b).
294. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(c); Ch. 149, sec. 54, § 11.96.110(3), 1984 Wash.
Sess. Laws 648, 680; S.B. 5344 § 5(8).
295. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181.
296. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 315 (Consol. 2013). Cf. Begleiter, supra note 265, at
323–24.
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Representation Under the Uniform Trust Code

Representation was codified in Article 3 of the UTC. Section 301 of
the UTC defines the scope of representation as it applies to the entire
code. In section 301, the UTC makes clear that delivering notice to a
representative on behalf of the represented beneficiary is effective,
except in cases where civil procedure rules require notice be delivered to
the actual beneficiary to be represented. 297 The UTC also makes clear
that the consent of the representative is binding on the represented party,
unless an objection is raised prior to the consent being given (discussed
further below). 298
1.

Limitations to Representation

The UTC codified various limitations to representation. Throughout
Article 3, the UTC specifically provides for the traditional bar 299 to
representation, which precludes representation where a conflict of
interest exists between the representative and the represented party. 300
The determination of a conflict of interest is not based upon the nature of
the beneficiaries’ technical interests in trust, but rather upon an analysis
of the facts of each case, the economic impacts of the matter at hand, and
the relationships of the parties. 301 The determination of a conflict is
situational and, if one exists, nullifies the effectiveness of the
representation. 302
Another limitation provided for in the UTC is the ability of a
represented party to object to and nullify the representation before
consent is given. 303 Although the possibility of a beneficiary objecting to
representation could undercut the flexibility of virtual representation, the
ability to object is a necessary provision to protect due process rights of
beneficiaries. 304 For example, in Barber v. Barber, 305 a guardian ad litem
was appointed to represent the unborn and unascertained heirs of the
297. U.T.C. § 301 & cmts (2010).
298. Id. § 301.
299. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. §§ 181–186.
300. U.T.C. §§ 302–304. This codifies the principle in the Restatement that representation is not
adequate if the representative is hostile to the represented party. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROP. § 181.
301. See U.T.C. § 304 cmts. (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 185).
302. See generally id. §§ 302–304 cmts.
303. Id. § 301.
304. See id. § 301 cmts. (citing Barber v. Barber, 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992)).
305. 837 P.2d 714.
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trustor in the context of a dispute regarding the sale of trust property.
The petitioner was a competent adult and contingent remainderman of
the trust. 306 In the course of various court hearings on the matter, the
guardian ad litem sought to expand the authority of his representation to
virtually represent all “non-income beneficiaries” of the trust, including
the petitioner. 307 The Alaska Supreme Court held that, in general, Alaska
statutes specifically required that notice of hearings regarding trust
matters be given to “interested parties,” including an adult, competent
contingent beneficiary. 308 In addition, the Court held that the trial court
had no statutory authority to expand the scope of representation of the
guardian ad litem to those beneficiaries beyond unborns and unknowns,
because the petitioner was a known and competent, adult beneficiary. 309
The Barber case does not specifically address whether virtual
representation of a competent, adult beneficiary is in and of itself a
violation of due process.
Another set of limitations in the UTC relates specifically to the
trustor. First, the trustor may not represent and bind beneficiaries in the
context of trust terminations or modifications. 310 This provision was
added to the UTC in 2004, to assuage concerns that the ability of the
trustor to garner such a power may result in inclusion of irrevocable
trusts established by the trustor in his or her gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes. 311 Second, an incapacitated trustor may be
represented by any relevant representative described in UTC Article 3,
except that such representative may not act to revoke the trustor’s
revocable trust or terminate an irrevocable trust established by the trustor
without specific authority or court order. 312 This provision supports the
policy illustrated by provisions in the UTC that protect the trustor’s
intentionally created estate plan. 313
2.

Virtual Representation

The UTC provides for virtual representation by permitting those with
a substantially identical interest in the trust to represent a minor,

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 717.
Id.
U.T.C. § 301 (2010).
Id. §§ 301 cmts., 411 cmts.
Id. § 301.
Id. §§ 411, 602, 301 cmts.
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incapacitated, or unborn beneficiary, or a beneficiary whose identity or
location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable. 314 The comments
to UTC section 304 describe “substantially identical interests” as
follows:
Typically, the interests of the representative and the person
represented will be identical. A common example would be a
trust providing for distribution to the settlor’s children as a class,
with an adult child being able to represent the interests of
children who are either minors or unborn. Exact identity of
interest is not required, only substantial identity with respect to
the particular question or dispute. Whether such identity is
present may depend on the nature of the interest. For example, a
presumptive remainderman may be able to represent alternative
remaindermen with respect to approval of a trustee’s report but
not with respect to interpretation of the remainder provision or
termination of the trust. 315
The UTC does not explicitly distinguish between horizontal or
vertical representation in its virtual representation section; however, the
comments to section 304 indicate that this section is meant to apply in a
vertical representation context. 316 Note, however, that the UTC does not
provide for virtual representation of a competent adult or entity
beneficiary, even in the virtual representation context. However, the
UTC makes clear that its provision is intended to supplement rather than
override common law, so such representation should be available if
consistent with a state’s common law. 317
Virtual representation under the UTC also permits a parent to
represent and bind his or her minor child, which was adapted from the
Uniform Probate Code. 318 It also provides for the ability of a holder of a
general testamentary power of appointment to represent the persons
whose interests in the trust are subject to that power as either takers in
default or as permissible appointees. 319

314. Id. § 304.
315. Id. § 304 cmts.
316. Id.
317. Id. § 303; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181 (1936). For example, under the
Restatement, if property has been given to C for life, remainder to C’s heirs, and C has a son and a
brother, C’s son can virtually represent C’s brother. C’s son would be C’s heir if C died
immediately but C’s brother would be heir if C’s son predeceased C. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
PROP. § 181 cmt. c, illus.
318. U.T.C. §§ 303(6), 303 cmts.
319. Id. §§ 302, 603; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181(c) (1936 & Supp. 1948).
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Fiduciary Representation

The UTC provides for fiduciary representation by permitting (1) a
conservator or guardian to represent and bind the estate or person that
the conservator or guardian controls; (2) a guardian to represent and bind
the estate of an incapacitated person if a conservator has not been
appointed; (3) an agent having authority to act with respect to the
particular question or dispute to represent and bind the principal; (4) a
trustee to represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust; and (5) a
personal representative to represent and bind persons interested in the
estate. 320 The UTC recognizes that fiduciary representation has long
been a part of the law. 321 The main modification to longstanding law that
was made by the UTC was in section 303(2), which blends the
traditionally separate duties of a guardian and conservator.322
4.

Court-Appointed Representation

The UTC provides for court-appointed representation by allowing the
court to appoint a representative to act on behalf of a minor,
incapacitated, or unborn beneficiary, or a beneficiary whose identity or
location is unknown and not reasonably ascertainable where the court
believes that no other representation is available or adequate. 323 The
contemplated court-appointed representative is a different role than the
typical guardian ad litem. 324
E.

Washington’s Adaptation of Representation in 2011 and 2013

RCW 11.96A.120 was significantly revised by the 2011 and 2013
Legislation to fill various gaps in Washington’s approach to
representation and to modernize the statute. The collective changes have
reorganized and clarified the section language, broadened the
applicability of virtual representation, confirmed fiduciary
representation, and refined court-appointed representation.

320. U.T.C. § 303(1)–(5).
321. Id. § 304.
322. Id. §§ 303(6), 303 cmts. In Uniform Act parlance, a guardian deals with personal issues such
as health care and residential placement, and a conservator handles an incapacitated person’s
financial affairs. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 102 (1997). In
Washington, the terms “guardian of the person” and “guardian of the estate” are used. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 11.88 (2012).
323. U.T.C. § 305.
324. See id. § 305 cmt.
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Limitations on Representation

First and foremost, all of the Washington representation subsections
provide that, as a condition precedent to the representation, the interests
of the representative and the represented party may not be in conflict.325
Next, the 2013 Legislation incorporated much of UTC section 301,
verbatim. It incorporated UTC section 301(a) and (b), which validate the
concept of substitute notice and the ability of the representative to give
binding consent. 326 The new statute also included, directly from the
UTC, sections that clarify when virtual representation of or by a trustor
is not permitted. 327 For example, the statute now indicates that the
provisions of RCW 11.96A.120 cannot supersede the rules of
RCW Chapters 11.88 or 11.92 related to the representation of an
incapacitated person, where court supervision already exists via a court
appointed guardian. 328 Representation of a trustor is also subject to RCW
11.103.030, which requires court approval for the guardian to represent a
trustor in amending or modifying the trust. 329 In addition, the new statute
provides that a trustor may not represent any beneficiary in the context
of a trust modification or termination. 330
Also taken verbatim from the UTC, the new statute specifically gives
the represented party the ability to object to representation prior to the
representative’s consent. 331 Under Washington law, both historically and
in the current revised statute, there are statutorily permitted situations
when adult beneficiaries may be virtually represented without the overt
requirement to provide notice of a hearing on the matter in question, of
the virtual representation itself, or to require the beneficiary’s
involvement in a non-judicial matter. For example, pursuant to RCW
11.96A.030(5), the “parties” who must be joined for an effective nonjudicial binding agreement related to a trust matter would include the
trustor, if living, the trustee, the trust beneficiaries, and where
applicable, the virtual representative of any of those described persons if
“the giving of notice to [the representative] would meet the notice
requirements of RCW 11.96A.120.” 332 Unlike in Barber, 333 RCW
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.120(4) (West 2013).
Id. § 11.96A.120(1)–(2).
S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(3) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 301(c)–(d).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(b) (2012).
Id. §§ 11.96A.120, 11.103.030.
Id. § 11.96A.120(3)(a).
S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(1)–(2) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 301(a)–(b).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.030(5)(l).
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11.96A.120(1) specifically validates the concept of constructive notice
to a represented party, provided, of course, that a conflict of interest does
not exist between the representative and the represented party.
Therefore, the represented party does not need to be a party to the nonjudicial agreement and may not ever know that it occurred.334 The
section allowing a represented party to object does not override the
ability of the representative to accept notice on behalf of the represented
party and does not create additional notice requirements.
2.

Fiduciary Representation

The new subsections of RCW 11.96A.120(4)(a) through (e), which
were adapted from the UTC, specifically codify fiduciary representation
in Washington, permitting fiduciaries with specific statutory authority
(e.g., a guardian) or with specifically granted authority (e.g., an agent
acting under a power of attorney) to virtually represent an individual.
The codification of fiduciary representation assists practitioners from a
practical perspective, 335 and is not a significant change from prior
Washington law. 336 However, new RCW 11.96A.120(4)(b), which was

333. 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992).
334. Cf. Begleiter, supra note 265, at 337–38, 369. This article analyzes case law in New York, a
jurisdiction that specifically authorizes the virtual representation of competent adult contingent trust
beneficiaries. While the author indicates that courts are hesitant to apply virtual representation in
these cases, the courts in New York have not invalidated this concept, which was enacted in New
York in 1967. The cases reviewed by the author indicate that the courts scrutinize the potential
economic-based conflicts of interest between the beneficiaries to determine whether virtual
representation of a living contingent beneficiary is permissible. The author also purports that review
of the conflict of interest at all times, rather than at the beginning of a matter, serves to bolster the
effectiveness of this type of virtual representation.
335. For example, this section also now clearly permits any required notice for a RCW Title 11
matter (e.g., the notice of the pendency of probate) where a fiduciary estate holds an interest (e.g., a
trust established under a will) to be given to the fiduciary as long as there is no conflict between the
fiduciary and the beneficiaries. Correlating language was also added to RCW 11.28.237, which
requires notice of the opening of a probate to be sent to the heirs, devisees, or legatees of the
decedent within twenty days of appointment of the personal representative. In another example,
RCW 11.96A.120(4)(c) requires that the ability of an attorney-in-fact to act as virtual representative
of his or her principal must be specifically granted in the durable power of attorney. While many
practitioners include enumerated powers that are granted to the attorney-in-fact in their durable
power of attorney form, RCW Chapter 11.94 does not describe the specific types of powers that are,
by default, included in a durable power. The specific requirement regarding representation therefore
provides some guidance to practitioners regarding content in light of the broad grant of authority
described in RCW Chapter 11.94.
336. See U.T.C. § 303 cmt. (“This section allows for representation of persons by their fiduciaries
(conservators, guardians, agents, trustees, and personal representatives), a principle that has long
been part of the law.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120 (1999); TEDRA Comments, supra
note 283, § 305.
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added by the 2013 Legislation, provides that the guardian of the person
of an incapacitated beneficiary may bind and represent such person if a
guardian of the person’s estate has not been appointed. This statute
expands the authority of a guardian of the person under RCW Chapters
11.88 and 11.92. However, the adoption of this subsection provides yet
another method for representation to streamline the resolution of matters
in a cost-effective way. For example, an individual may have chosen to
create a revocable living trust with all of her assets to avoid the need to
appoint a guardian of her estate upon future incapacity. If the individual
later becomes incapacitated while all of her assets are in trust, she may
have a guardian of her person appointed to care for her health needs. If
an issue involving the assets held in the trust were to arise, absent any
other available representative, the guardian of her person may represent
her instead of requiring the new appointment of a guardian of her estate
to act on her behalf.
3.

Virtual Representation

Modifications were made to the Washington virtual representation
statute in 2011 and 2013 to incorporate UTC provisions and to clarify
the scope of the Washington approach. Further clarification would be
beneficial, however. This section first describes the current Washington
statute and then makes a proposal for further amendment.
a.

Parent for Child

New section RCW 11.96A.120(4)(f) permits parents to accept notice
on behalf of minor and unborn children who do not have court-appointed
guardians. Initially omitted from the statute in 2011, this provision was
added in the 2013 Legislation to further streamline the utility of virtual
representation and to incorporate UTC section 303(f). This provision
may be unavailable in some circumstances in Washington, because if
community property is contributed to a trust, both parents would be
considered trustors of the trust. The trustor is prohibited from
representing a beneficiary in the context of a termination or modification
of trust. 337 In addition, representation by the parent-trustor, while not
determinative, may indicate retained control of gifted property by the
parent under I.R.C. section 2036. 338

337. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 5(3)(a) (Wash. 2013).
338. See I.R.C. § 2036 (2006).
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Representation of Minor, Unborn, Unascertainable, and Missing
Beneficiaries

New section RCW 11.96A.120(5) includes a provision that is
identical to UTC section 304. It greatly expands the utility of virtual
representation in Washington. First, it permits living adult beneficiaries
to virtually represent living minor beneficiaries and unborn,
unascertainable, and known but unlocatable beneficiaries if they have
“substantially identical” interests. Practically, this revision to the statute
acts to supplement the horizontal representation section, which requires
notice to all “living persons” who are beneficiaries. 339 Without this new
subsection, a special representative or guardian ad litem would need to
be appointed to represent living minor, incapacitated, or known but
unlocatable beneficiaries who are class members. The new section is not
limited to horizontal representation and allows virtual representation in
any circumstance where a present, competent adult holds an interest that
is “substantially the same” as a minor, unborn, incapacitated, or missing
beneficiary. Most instances of vertical representation would be covered
by RCW 11.96A.120(7) and (8); but if there is a scenario not included in
those sections that involved a minor, unborn, incapacitated, or
unlocatable beneficiary, this section will allow representation. The
addition of this section, using verbatim UTC language, raises an
interpretive question regarding whether “substantially identical” interests
is different from the “same interest” standard contained in
RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7) and (8). While the common law indicates that
the interpretive trend for the phrase “same interest” is to equate it with
“substantially identical interest,” the use of the two phrases in the same
statute may warrant further amendment for clarification.
c.

Holder of Power of Appointment

New section RCW 11.96A.120(9) contains a modified version of
UTC section 302. The 2011 Legislation first introduced this section. It
provides that the holder of a testamentary or lifetime general power of
appointment may virtually represent permissible appointees and takers in
default. 340 In addition, the holder of a limited power of appointment that
only excludes the holder, his creditors, his estate, and the creditors of his
estate as permissible appointees, can virtually represent permissible

339. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(6) (2012).
340. Id. § 11.96A.120(3)(d).
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appointees and takers in default. 341 The Washington statute had
expanded upon the UTC to include holders of certain limited powers
since the holders of any power, general or limited, could affect or
eliminate the interest of a permissible appointee or distributee.
This section was further revised by the 2013 Legislation to broaden
the permissible virtual representation by power-holders. As in the 2011
statute, the holder of a general appointment, whether exercisable during
life or at death, may still represent the takers in default or the permissible
distributees. 342 However, representation by a limited power-holder was
modified significantly in 2013. First, the type of limited power of
appointment to which the virtual representation may apply was
broadened. The statute no longer requires that the limited power of
appointment be the broadest possible limited power. The intent of this
particular change was to make the application of this power more
practical because the committee felt that most practitioners were using a
more restrictive limited powers in their practice (e.g., a power to appoint
among the trustor’s lineal descendants and charities). The holder of a
limited power of appointment, whether exercisable at death or during
life, may now represent permissible appointees and takers in default, but
only if the takers in default to be represented are also permissible
appointees. 343 Without this limitation, a trustor could give a limited
power to an undesirable permissible appointee as a straw man, making it
unlikely that the power would be exercised. This “straw man” power of
appointment could then serve to eliminate the need to give any notice or
information to the takers in default, even though they would be the
parties with a real interest in the trust. This concern does not carry over
to general powers of appointment on the theory that the holder of a
general power is tantamount to an owner of the property 344 and should
therefore be able to virtually represent any persons with a contingent
following interest.

341. A limited power of appointment that only excludes the holder of the power, his creditors, his
estate, and the creditors of his estate is the broadest power that avoids taxation of the power holder.
I.R.C. § 2041. The 2003 Task Force recognized that trustors may want to give a power of
appointment to an income beneficiary to avoid the notice requirements but would not want to create
tax issues for the holder of the power, so they included this option.
342. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(9); S.B. 5344 § 5(9).
343. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.120(9) (West 2013).
344. The holder of a general power of appointment can take the property for herself and is
considered the owner of such property for gift and estate tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 2041.
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Representation of Charities by the Attorney General

New section RCW 11.96A.120(10) includes the Attorney General as
a permissible virtual representative for charitable interests in a trust that
are subject to change or divestment, as long as the charity is not a trustee
or a permissible distributee. This section was meant to replace similar
language formerly included in RCW 11.97.010(2) by the 2011
Legislation, which allowed for delivery of the mandatory sixty days’
notice to the Attorney General instead of to a divestible charity. The
language used in the former RCW 11.97.010(2) referred to a “charity’s
future interest that may be revoked.” The language in the new virtual
representation section is broader to allow for the Attorney General to
virtually represent the various types of charitable interests in trusts;
recognizing that some trustors create specific, charitably-minded trusts,
while others create trusts with remote contingent charitable interests.
New section RCW 11.96A.120(10) provides that if a specific charity is
aware of or is involved in the trust administration (e.g., as trustee or as a
permissible distributee), then the Attorney General may not act as the
charity’s representative. However, if the charity is unnamed (e.g., the
trustor allows the trustee to choose a charitable beneficiary) or its
interest is divestible (e.g., the trustor retained the right to change the
beneficiary), then the charitable interest may be represented by the
Attorney General.
4.

Court Appointed Representation

There were no changes to the ability to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of a beneficiary. However, a change was made in
2013 Legislation to the statute that establishes the procedure for
appointing a special representative. 345 Instead of only allowing a
personal representative or a trustee to petition the court for the
appointment of a special representative, the 2013 Legislation modified
the statute to permit any party to a matter in dispute, or the parent of a
minor party to a dispute, to request the appointment of a special
representative. 346 This change reflects the fact that modern practice
incorporates the use of a special representative in many types of
matters, 347 not only those that involve a personal representative or a
trustee. This section does not preclude a party who is conflicted for the
345. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.250 (2012).
346. Id. § 11.96A.250(1).
347. This refers to special representative as defined in RCW 11.96A.030. See id. § 11.96A.030.
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purposes of virtual representation from petitioning the court for the
appointment of a special representative for a beneficiary. In fact, many
times, a parent may be the most logical virtual representative for his or
her child, but may be subject to a conflict that precludes representation.
It may be that the parent is in the best position to understand the
circumstances of the child-beneficiary and to know that the appointment
of a special representative is the best course of action. The court may
always consider the interests of the petitioner in the matter when
determining whether the proposed special representative is
appropriate. 348
D.

Remaining Issues in Washington Law of Representation

When undertaking the revision of the trust statutes, both of the Task
Forces attempted to address some interpretive areas of the virtual
representation statute and to modernize the statute by incorporating
concepts from the UTC, while retaining the longstanding provisions of
RCW 11.96A.120. The resulting law has some overlap and construction
issues that should be addressed.
1.

Semantic Issues

Before the 2011 Legislation, RCW 11.96A.120 referred only to
virtual representation in the context of the delivery of notice under Title
11. For example, RCW 11.96A.120(2)(a) said, in part, “Any notice
requirement in this title is satisfied if notice is given as
follows . . . notice may be given to the living persons who would
constitute the class . . . and the persons shall virtually represent all other
members of the class.” 349 It was not explicitly stated that the statute
allowed for representation in a situation where notice was not required,
such as the execution of a non-judicial binding agreement, but
involvement and consent was required. However, the practice and
interpretation of the statute was broad because the common law context
of virtual representation included not only notice, but the ability to
represent in judicial proceedings, and bind represented parties. 350
By the 2011 Legislation, RCW 11.96A.120 was modified to include
various provisions of the UTC, which uses the phrase “may represent
and bind” in its representation statutes. The new language of

348. Id. § 11.96A.250(1)(b).
349. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(2)(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
350. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 181 (1936).
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RCW 11.96A.120 mixed pre-2010 Washington statutory phrases with
UTC phrases, which caused some confusion among practitioners. The
updated language of RCW 11.96A.120(1) regarding fiduciary
representation used the UTC phrase “may represent and bind.” The
updated language of RCW 11.96A.120(3)(a) through (c) and (4),
regarding virtual representation and the conflict of interest exception,
maintained the original pre-2010 references to satisfying “notice
requirements” via virtual representation. The updated language of
RCW 11.96A.120(3)(d) regarding representation by a power holder
stated that the representative “may accept notice and virtually represent
and bind” persons. 351 Practitioners were concerned that because the
language of RCW 11.96A.120(3)(d) included references to both
acceptance of notice and giving binding consent, that somehow the
disparate references in the earlier sections were significant. For example,
since RCW 11.96A.120(1) referred only to the ability of fiduciaries to
“represent and bind” a party, there were concerns that the fiduciaries
could not also accept notice on behalf of a beneficiary. While this may
have been largely a semantic issue, it caused sufficient ambiguity that
the 2013 Legislation sought to standardize the language in the various
sections of the statute. However, there are still inconsistencies that
should be corrected.
2.

“Same Interest” Concept

The sections of RCW 11.96A.120 before the 2011 and 2013
Legislation permitted “vertical” virtual representation only where the
living person who would be the representative had the “same interest” as
the beneficiary to be represented. There is no precedent in Washington
that defines “same interest” in the trusts and estates context. Over the
last fifty years, the legal usage of that phrase has changed, which is best
illustrated by a review of New York case law. 352 In earlier cases, courts
used the phrase “same interest” in the trusts and estates context to
indicate that the representative and the party being represented needed to
have the “same technical interest” in a trust or estate (e.g., an income
interest beneficiary could not have ever represented a remainderman).353
In later years, interpreting the same New York representation statute,
courts used the phrase “same interest” to mean that the representative
351. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.120(3)(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
352. See Begleiter, supra note 265, at 323–46.
353. See, e.g., In re Collins’ Trust, 130 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); In re Pratt, 64
N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946).
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and the party being represented instead need to have the same economic
interest in the issue at hand. 354
In an article describing the application of virtual representation as
adopted in TEDRA, the meaning of “same interest” was clearly
described as requiring the same technical interest in trust. Elsewhere, in
the comments to TEDRA, the drafting committee indicates that a
conflict of interest exists and virtual representation is not possible when
the “economic interests” of the representative and the person represented
conflict with regard to the issue at hand. It is unclear whether this
reference to an “economic interest” in the conflict of interest context
would also apply to the interpretation of the meaning of the phrase
“same interest” in the statute. Arguably, based on a plain reading of the
statute, the reference to “same interest” is a condition precedent to
virtual representation being permissible in the first place, while the
“conflict of interest” exception precludes virtual representation that is
otherwise de facto permissible. The 2011 Legislation did not address the
meaning of this phrase, and unfortunately, the 2013 Legislation may
have confused the matter further with the verbatim adoption of UTC
Section 304 alongside the existing Washington statutes.
3.

Timing of Determination of No Conflict

As noted above, 355 one person cannot represent another if there is a
conflict of interest between the representative and the represented party
as to the matter at issue. In the context of nonjudicial dispute resolution,
the conflict test is applied at the start of the resolution process to
determine whether any court appointed representatives are required, and
the conflict issue may or may not be revisited during the course of the
resolution process. 356 Likewise, in the context of delivering a report,
notice, or trust information, the conflict test is applied at the time of
delivery. 357 The Washington statute is silent on the extent to which the
conflict determination must be repeated. However, the basis for allowing
virtual representation is the “identity of interests,” which ensures
adequate representation of the represented parties’ interests. Any conflict
that may arise in the course of the resolution process will disqualify the

354. See, e.g., In re Estate of Levy, 496 N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); In re Sanders,
474 N.Y.S.2d 215, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
355. See supra Part IV.E.1.
356. See Begleiter, supra note 265, at 369.
357. Id.
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representative. 358 In addition, a trustee should be aware of the fact that
representation for the purposes of delivering a report, notice, or trust
information should be reviewed each time an action is taken. If a court
later determines that there was a conflict of interest that prevented use of
virtual representation, then the agreement reached, order entered, or
notice or information delivered will not be binding on the represented
parties. Virtual representation should not be used unless the lack of
conflict is clear.359
4.

Overlap

The 2011 and 2013 Legislation added provisions from the UTC, but
in order to avoid limiting existing representation available in
Washington, the existing statutory provisions, now to be codified at
RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7) and (8), were preserved. The result is
significant overlap among the sections, which could result in confusion.
5.

Proposed Amendment to RCW 11.96A.120

In order to address the issues identified in this section, the 2012 Task
Force has proposed an amendment to the virtual representation statute.
The proposal is attached as Appendix A. The overlap and confusion
between sections to be codified as RCW 11.96A.120(6), (7), and (8) are
now clarified. Under the existing statute, it is unclear whether
representation of any remainder interest, including a vested remainder,
would fit under subsection (8), or whether representation by a holder of
a vested, as opposed to a contingent, remainder was limited to situations
where the subsequent interest holders were related. The characterization
of vested and contingent remainders can vary and is not well understood
by most lawyers and courts. 360 Under the proposal, the holder of any
interest, whether currently vested or contingent upon future events, can
virtually represent all subsequent holders of a substantially identical
interest, as long as there is no conflict of interest. In addition, the
proposal uses the “substantially identical interest” language throughout
the statute and clarifies that the conflict of interest test applies

358. See id. at 375.
359. See id. at 349.
360. See, e.g., Horton v. Bd. of Educ., 32 Wash. 2d 99, 201 P.2d 163 (1949) (grant of remainder
interest to university was not subject to any express contingency but because the trust remainder
was subject to reduction by discretionary distributions to income beneficiary the court held it was a
contingent remainder); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (2010) (all remainder interests, even
if vested, are subject to survival requirement).
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throughout the representation, not just at the initial determination of
whether representation is permissible.
V.

OTHER CHANGES

This Part discusses various other provisions of the UTC that were
adopted into Washington law in the 2011 and 2013 Legislation. In
certain instances, UTC language was adopted verbatim and in other
instances, UTC language or concepts were modified. Where possible, a
discussion of how the 2011 and 2013 Legislation changed prior
Washington law is also included.
A.

Duty of Loyalty

RCW 11.98.078 codifies and clarifies the trustee’s duty of loyalty. In
particular, it clarifies what transactions are subject to the no further
inquiry rule, and what transactions can be defended by a trustee on the
basis of fairness. It is based on UTC section 802, but was significantly
revised by the 2003 Task Force. Existing law relies on common law to
define the trustee’s duty of loyalty, which is central to the trustee’s role.
This section not only codifies the duty, but sets forth clearer boundaries
to the duty, making it one of the most significant sections in the bill.
Before the 2011 Legislation, Washington courts depended on the
common law to define the trustee’s duty of loyalty. 361 Under the
common law, a trustee’s duty of loyalty requires the trustee to
“administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiary.” 362 The
duty of loyalty prohibits the trustee from self-dealing, which is
transacting in her individual capacity with the trust, or entering into
transactions where the trustee is not directly dealing with the trust, but
nevertheless has a conflict of interest. 363 If a trustee breaches her duty of
loyalty by self-dealing, there is no further inquiry and the transaction is
voidable by the beneficiaries regardless of the fairness of the
transaction. 364 As stated in Scott and Ascher on Trusts,
[u]nder this rule, a trustee who has violated the duty of loyalty is
liable without further inquiry into whether the breach has
resulted in any actual benefit to the trustee, whether the trustee
361. See In re Guardianship of Eisenberg, 43 Wash. App. 761, 766–68, 719 P.2d 187, 191–92
(1986) (referring to Restatement (Second) of Trusts for rules defining trustee’s duties).
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
363. IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, §§ 170–170.25.
364. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 543 (2d rev. ed. 1993).
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has acted in good faith, whether the transaction was fair, or
even, in some cases, whether the breach has caused any actual
harm to either the trust or its beneficiaries. 365
For example, if a trustee purchased property from the trust, paying
fair market value, and the property later increased in value, the
beneficiaries could, on the basis of no further inquiry, demand that the
trustee return the property to the trust, getting only a refund of the
trustee’s purchase price. If the breach is a less direct conflict, a trustee
may be able to uphold the transaction by proving fairness. 366 To be able
to defend a transaction on the basis of fairness, under the common law a
trustee would have to show that her own interests in the particular
transaction were not sufficient to bring it into the zone of self-dealing. 367
The categories of transactions that expand the zone of self-dealing
beyond direct transactions between trustee and trust include sale of
property to the trustee’s spouse or attorney, or to a corporation in which
the trustee has a substantial interest. 368 Under the common law, the duty
of loyalty could be waived by the trustor, and a particular self-dealing
transaction could be nevertheless allowed if approved in advance by a
court or approved or ratified by the beneficiaries. 369
The UTC not only codified the common law of the duty of loyalty; it
also drew more clear lines around the self-dealing prohibition. Under
UTC section 802, any transaction entered into by the trustee involving
the investment or management of trust property for the trustee’s personal
account or “which is otherwise affected by a conflict between the
trustee’s fiduciary and personal interests” 370 is voidable by beneficiaries.
This language appears to be broader than the common law
formulations 371 because there is no requirement that the conflict be
significant or substantial. However, the UTC distinguishes between
direct self-dealing, where the trustee has directly entered into the
transaction with the trust, and transactions that involve affiliates of the
trustee (such as the spouse or other related parties). Direct self-dealing is

365. 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 17.2, at 1080 (4th ed.
2006).
366. In re Estate of Rothko, 372 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1977).
367. See Karen E. Boxx, Of Punctilios and Paybacks: The Duty of Loyalty Under the Uniform
Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 279, 287 (2002).
368. See SCOTT ET AL., supra note 365, §§ 17.2.1.4, 17.2.1.3.
369. See id. §§ 17.2.12, 17.2.13.
370. U.T.C. § 802(b) (2010).
371. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-713 (2010); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170
cmt. c (1959).
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irrebuttably presumed to be affected by a conflict and therefore voidable
(which is the classic no further inquiry rule). 372 If the transaction was
with a related party, 373 then the presumption that the transaction was
affected by the conflict (and is therefore voidable) can be rebutted by a
showing that “the transaction was not affected by a conflict between
personal and fiduciary interests.” 374 Under common law, if the
transaction with a related party was considered to be in the zone of selfdealing, the no further inquiry rule applied and the transaction was
voidable. The UTC changes that approach, and sets a presumption for
transactions with affiliates, but allows the trustee to rebut the
presumption by a showing that the conflict of interest did not affect the
transaction. The fairness of the transaction (e.g., whether a fair price was
paid) can be used as evidence that the conflict did not affect the
transaction; but fairness alone does not authorize the transaction.
However, this is a loosening of the common law duty. Under the
common law, transactions with someone as close as a spouse or a
corporation controlled by the trustee would trigger the no further inquiry
rule. But under the UTC, transactions with affiliates as close as those can
be defended by the trustee with arguments that the conflict in fact did
not affect the transaction. The UTC broadens the reach of self-dealing,
however, by allowing a beneficiary to challenge a transaction, even if
the trustee or listed affiliate was not involved, if the beneficiary can
show that the transaction was affected by a conflict between the trustee’s
fiduciary and personal interests. The beneficiary does not have the
advantage of the presumption of voidability that is given when the
trustee or an affiliate is involved. If the beneficiary can show the conflict
affected the transaction, though, the beneficiary can void the transaction.
By contrast, under common law, if the transaction was outside the zone
of self-dealing, then the trustee could defend the transaction by showing
the transaction was fair. 375
RCW 11.98.078 adopted the UTC approach, with one significant
change. The text of the UTC statute did not specify how the presumption
of voidability for affiliate transactions could be rebutted; only the

372. See U.T.C. § 802.
373. The related parties that trigger this presumption are enumerated in the statute and are:
spouse, descendants, siblings, parents, or spouses of such relatives, of the trustee, agent, or attorney
of trustee or a corporation or other person or enterprise in which the trustee or a person that owns a
significant interest in the trustee, has an interest that might affect the trustee’s best judgment. Id.
§ 802(b)(6).
374. Id. § 802 cmt.
375. See Boxx, supra note 367, at 279.

05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

UPDATED WASHINGTON TRUST ACT

10/10/2013 10:31 AM

881

comments addressed that issue. The Washington statute states expressly
that “[t]he presumption is rebutted if the trustee establishes that the
conflict did not adversely affect the interests of the beneficiaries.” 376
Similar to the UTC approach, fairness of the transaction could be used to
rebut the presumption, but there could be other elements that adversely
affected the beneficiaries, such as the loss of a business opportunity, so
fairness is not an absolute defense. The Washington statute also added
language to clarify that a transaction between the trustee and the trust is
irrevocably presumed voidable: “A sale, encumbrance, or other
transaction involving the investment or management of trust property
entered into by the trustee for the trustee’s own personal account that is
voidable under subsection (2) of this section may be voided by a
beneficiary without further proof.” 377
The UTC includes the common law exceptions to voidability: (1) if
the trust agreement authorized the transaction; (2) if there was court
approval of the transaction; (3) if the beneficiary consented, ratified, or
released the trustee; (4) if the beneficiary did not comply with the statute
of limitations; and (5) if the transaction predated the trustee’s term as
trustee or such time that the trustee expected to become trustee. 378 The
Washington statute includes the UTC provisions. 379
The UTC contains a provision that a transaction between a trustee and
a beneficiary that does not involve trust property can be voidable unless
the trustee proves the transaction was fair to the beneficiary. 380 The 2003
Task Force decided not to include that provision because of concerns
that national banks that serve as trustee in one state could unwittingly be
entering into potentially voidable transactions in another state. The UTC
also contains a provision that if a trustee individually takes a trust
business opportunity, that transaction is presumptively void. The 2003
Task Force did not include this provision in the Washington statute
because such a transaction would already be covered in the general duty
of loyalty as imposed under the statute and common law, and was
therefore not necessary. 381 It is important to note that the intention of the
drafters was to preserve the scope of the common law of duty of loyalty,
except as specifically modified in the statute.
The UTC also included exceptions to the duty of loyalty for routine
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.078(3)(b) (2012).
Id. § 11.98.078(4).
U.T.C. § 802(b).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.078(2).
U.T.C. § 802(d).
SCOTT ET AL., supra note 365, § 17.2.9.
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transactions involving corporate trustees. Under section 802(f), a trustee
can invest in mutual funds for which the trustee provides services, even
if the mutual fund pays a fee to the trustee. However, the investment
must still meet the standards of the prudent investor rule, and the trustee
must give the beneficiaries annual notice about the fees they are
receiving. 382 The Washington statute includes that provision, which is
noteworthy because it creates an additional notice requirement for some
corporate trustees. 383 Under UTC section 802(h), several transactions
which could potentially be considered self-dealing are authorized as long
as they are fair to the beneficiaries: (1) appointment and compensation
of the trustee; (2) a transaction between a trust and another trust, estate,
or guardianship in which the trustee or beneficiary is involved; (3) a
deposit in a financial institution operated by the trustee; and (4) an
advance by the trustee to protect the trust. The Washington statute has a
similar provision, but it states more clearly that such transactions cannot
be voided if fair to the beneficiaries. It replaces the provision regarding
an advance with a provision authorizing “[a]ny loan from the trustee or
its affiliate,” and it adds to the list of authorized transactions, “[a]
delegation and any transaction made pursuant to the delegation from a
trustee to an agent that is affiliated or associated with the trustee.”384
Finally, the Washington statute includes the codification of the common
law duty of impartiality set forth in UTC section 803. 385
A related amendment in the 2011 Legislation added language to RCW
11.100.090, which restricts the trustee from selling or buying
investments from itself or related entities. The amendment limits the
restriction to circumstances not authorized under the statutory duty of
loyalty.
B.

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations applicable to claims brought against trustees
was significantly revised in the 2011 Legislation. Under previous law,
there was a three-year statute of limitations that began to run upon the
earlier of discovery of the breach, termination of the trust or the trustee’s
repudiation of the trust, or discharge of the trustee. 386 Thus, if a breach
was not “discovered,” then the statute did not begin to run until the end
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

See Boxx, supra note 375, at 300–01 (explaining the reasons for this exception).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.078(5) (West 2013).
WASH REV. CODE § 11.98.078(6) (2012).
Id. § 11.98.078(7).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070 (2010).

05 - Boxx Groblewski Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

UPDATED WASHINGTON TRUST ACT

10/10/2013 10:31 AM

883

of the trustee’s involvement with the trust. The revised section allows a
trustee to start the running of the clock by furnishing a report that
adequately disclosed the basis for a potential claim, and states the time
limits for filing a claim. 387 However, if no report is sent, then the
beneficiary can bring an action up to three years after termination of the
trust or discharge of the trustee, even if the breach was discoverable
much earlier. 388 One noteworthy difference from the former law is that
in order to start the statute running, the trustee must affirmatively
provide information to the beneficiary, including time limits to filing
claims. Under previous law, if the beneficiary discovered the potential
claim independently of trustee communication, that would be sufficient
to start the three-year statute running. 389 The change in the statute
therefore puts the burden on the trustee to take action before the statute
starts to run. However, the new statute offers a “safe harbor” form of
report so that the trustee can be reasonably assured that the three-year
period has been triggered. 390 The new Washington statute is based on
UTC section 1005, with two significant variations. First, the UTC has a
limitations period of one year upon furnishing a report, rather than three
years; 391 if no report is given, claimants have five years from termination
of the trust or discharge of the trustee, instead of three years. 392 Second,
the UTC does not spell out what constitutes an adequate report. The
Washington provisions are based on a California statute that prescribes a
report to beneficiaries that satisfies notice provisions. 393
C.

Rules of Construction

Section 112 of the UTC provides that the rules of construction for
wills are also applicable to construction of trusts, both revocable and
irrevocable. Section 112 is now codified in Washington at
RCW 11.97.020. Because trusts, particularly revocable living trusts, are
commonly used as will substitutes, the trend is to unify the rules
applicable to each, 394 and this section furthers that goal.

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.070(1)(a) (West 2013).
Id. § 11.96A.070(1)(c).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.070(1)(a)(i) (2010).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.070(1)(b) (2012).
Compare id. § 11.96.070(a), with U.T.C. § 1005(a) (2010).
Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96.070(c), with U.T.C. § 1005(c).
See CAL. PROB. CODE § 16063 (2011).
See U.T.C. § 112 cmt. (2010); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25(2) cmt. e (2003).
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Consolidation of Trusts

The 2013 Legislation modified RCW 11.98.080 to clarify the statute
and to integrate the methods provided for in the UTC. Prior Washington
law permitted consolidation of trusts if certain criteria were met: (1) the
trust provisions permit; (2) all persons interested in the trusts
affirmatively consent; (3) a non-judicial agreement is entered into by all
persons interested in the trusts; or (4) consolidation is ordered
judicially. 395 In addition, consolidation of trusts was only permitted if
further criteria were satisfied: (1) the trusts to be consolidated were
substantially similar; (2) consolidation isn’t inconsistent with the intent
of the trustor; and (3) if consolidation would not materially impair the
interests of the beneficiaries. 396
The 2013 Legislation integrated the UTC method of consolidation of
trusts into the Washington statute in order to create a more efficient
option for consolidation. New RCW 11.98.080 has eliminated the need
for parties interested in the trust to consent to consolidation. Instead, it
permits the trustee to provide advance notice of a proposed consolidation
to the qualified beneficiaries and gives them thirty days to object to the
proposal. 397 If no objection is received, then the trustee may proceed
with the proposal and the consolidation has the effect of a binding court
order. 398 The remaining requirements and additional options of the prior
version of RCW 11.98.080 remain intact.
E.

UTC Definitions

As discussed in Part II.D.1, the 2013 Legislation integrated the UTC
definitions of “qualified beneficiaries” and “permissible distributees”
throughout RCW Chapter 11.98 and also used those definitions in
selected other sections, such as venue, where appropriate.399 These two
definitions identify the types of beneficiaries to whom certain notices are
to be given or from whom consents are to be received. The 2012 Task
Force believed that using these definitions throughout RCW Chapter
11.98 struck a balance between making certain trust administration
activities less burdensome and costly but still protecting the interests of

395. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.080.
396. Id.
397. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.080(2)(a) (West 2013).
398. Id.
399. See id. §§ 11.96A.050, 11.98.080(2)(a) (providing that the definitions apply only to chapter
11.98 or as specifically reference elsewhere in Title 11).
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both trustees and the “stakeholder” beneficiaries. These definitions were
integrated into several statutes 400 covering issues ranging from transfer
of situs to delivery of trust administration for pet trusts. The 2012 Task
Force used the definitions for a few select other statutes outside of RCW
Chapter 11.98 by specific use of the term but declined to extend the
UTC definitions comprehensively into RCW 11.96A or further into
RCW Title 11 without additional review and analysis.
F.

Use of Email for Notice

Section 109 of the UTC provides that any required notice must be
given “in a manner reasonably suitable under the circumstances and
likely to result in receipt.” 401 The section further gives examples of
permissible methods of giving notice and includes email. The Task
Force wanted to authorize giving of notice by email, but chose instead to
use the approach in the Washington Business Corporation Act. 402
RCW 11.96A.110 was revised to allow notice by email only if the
recipient had previously consented to notice by email. Such consent can
be revoked at any time, and two undeliverable email notices is deemed a
revocation of that consent.
G.

General Trust Provisions

Article 4 of the UTC sets forth general trust principles previously
found only in common law. Several of the provisions were included in
the 2011 Legislation, with the general intent that they were merely
codification of existing Washington common law rather than creating
new law. Washington case law on trusts is sparse, so much of what we
characterize as common law is based on general U.S. common law
relating to trusts, as reflected in the Restatement. 403 Exceptions to that
general rule, where changes to the common law were made in the
statute, are noted below.

400. The definitions were integrated into RCW 11.96A.050, 11.96A.120, 11.98.005, 11.98.015,
11.98.019, 11.98.039, 11.98.041, 11.98.045, 11.98.051, 11.98.078, 11.106.020, and 11.118.050. For
most of these statutes, the integration of the definitions merely updated the verbiage to create
consistency and did not create a substantive change.
401. U.T.C. § 109 (2010).
402. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.01.410 (2012).
403. See, e.g., Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wash. 2d 365, 113 P.3d 463 (2005)
(example of court relying on the Restatement of Trusts as a statement of applicable common law of
trusts in Washington).
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Trust Creation

RCW 11.98.008 is based on UTC section 401 and codifies common
law regarding methods of creating a trust. It does not include the UTC
provision that a trust may be created by exercise of a power of
appointment in favor of a trustee, but that omission does not invalidate
Washington trusts created in that manner. Trusts validly created under
common law are still valid under Washington law because the statute
only supplements common law. The UTC power of appointment
language was omitted because the language of a power of appointment
governs whether the donee of the power can appoint to a trustee, and the
2003 Task Force did not want the statute to imply otherwise.
The section requires a transfer of property, or identification of
specific property when the trustor is also the trustee. Existing statutes
allow certain beneficiary designations to constitute “property” sufficient
to satisfy this section. RCW 11.12.250, the Washington codification of
the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, validates a gift under
will to a previously unfunded trust, and such gift under will would be
sufficient to constitute the necessary property interest. 404
RCW 11.98.170(1)(b) authorizes unfunded life insurance or retirement
asset trusts:
a trust is valid even if the only corpus consists of the right of the
trustee to receive as beneficiary insurance or retirement plan
proceeds; any such trustee may also receive assets, other than
insurance or retirement plan proceeds, by testamentary
disposition or otherwise and, unless directed otherwise by the
transferor of the assets, shall administer all property of the trust
according to the terms of the trust agreement. 405
RCW 11.98.011, setting forth the requirements for creating a trust, is
identical to UTC section 402, except for the specific references to
Washington statutes governing pet trusts and noncharitable purpose
trusts, as discussed below in Part V.3. The statute requires the trustor to
have capacity, which for revocable trusts is the capacity to make a
will, 406 and for irrevocable trusts it is the capacity to transfer the
property into the trust. 407
404.
405.
406.
407.

See U.T.C. § 401 cmt..
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.170(1)(b).
See discussion of § 11.103 infra, Part VI. K.
See U.T.C. § 402 cmt.; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.1 (2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS §§ 18–22 (1959).
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Under the statute, if the same person is the sole trustee and the sole
beneficiary, then the trust is not valid. This is a codification of the
doctrine of merger, recognized in Estate of Lonneker v. Lonneker. 408
Under the doctrine of merger, if one person holds all the managerial and
ownership power as trustee, and all beneficial interests as the sole
beneficiary, then the person’s interest is fee simple. 409 Note that if there
are remainder beneficiaries, even if the trust is revocable, the doctrine of
merger does not apply because there are other beneficiaries. 410
The statute requires a definite beneficiary, with some exceptions, 411
which is the traditional common law requirement. 412 Pet trusts, which
already existed under Washington statute, and noncharitable purpose
trusts, which were added by the 2011 Legislation, are exceptions to the
common law rule requiring ascertainable beneficiaries. However, the
statute gives an additional, albeit limited, exception to this rule: if a
trustee is given the power to choose a beneficiary from an indefinite
class of persons, and the trustee exercises the power, then the choice is
valid. If the trustee fails to exercise the power within a reasonable time,
the property passes to the persons who would have taken the property
had the power not been conferred.
RCW 11.98.012 is the comity provision that validates, for
Washington purposes, inter vivos trusts that were validly created under
another state’s laws. It does not apply to testamentary trusts. It provides
that an inter vivos trust is valid in Washington if it was validly created
under the laws where the trust agreement was executed, or under the
laws of the jurisdiction where the trustor lived, where the trustee lived or
did business, or where any of the property was located, as that law
provided at the time the trust was created (if an irrevocable trust), or at
the time the trust became irrevocable (if originally an irrevocable trust).
The Washington statute varies from UTC section 403 in distinguishing
the applicable law for revocable and irrevocable trusts. Testamentary
trusts are not addressed in this section, but generally testamentary trusts
will be recognized if valid under the law of the decedent’s domicile as of
the decedent’s death. 413
RCW 11.98.013 is identical to UTC section 404, and states that a
408. 45 Wash. App. 222, 724 P.2d 1088 (1986).
409. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 122.
410. See U.T.C. § 402 cmt.
411. Charitable trusts, pet trusts, and noncharitable purpose trusts are the exceptions.
412. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 44–46; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 112–122.
413. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 269 (1971).
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trust’s purposes must be lawful, not contrary to public policy, and
possible to achieve. This is a statement of existing common law. The
Restatement (Third) of Trusts gives the following examples of trusts that
would not be permissible: performance of the trust would require the
trustee to commit a criminal or tortious act, the trustor’s purpose in
setting up the trust was to defraud creditors, or the consideration for
establishing the trust was illegal. 414 A “capricious” purpose, such as a
direction to the trustee to throw money into the ocean or burn down a
house, is likely to be contrary to public policy. 415
2.

Evidence of Oral Trust

RCW 11.98.014, modeled after UTC section 407, clarifies that a trust
can be oral except as otherwise required by statute; but if oral, the
creation of the trust and its terms must be proven by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. The Washington State Supreme Court has
previously recognized that trusts need not be in writing, 416 but the statute
adds the clear, cogent, and convincing evidentiary standard to proving
oral trusts. The statute of frauds, 417 which has been interpreted to require
a trust holding real estate to be in writing, 418 is the primary exception to
the allowance of oral trusts.
3.

Noncharitable Purpose Trusts

RCW 11.98.015 creates an exception to the general requirement that a
private trust have an ascertainable beneficiary. Under common law, a
trust must either have an ascertainable beneficiary or have a charitable
purpose, 419 and benevolent purpose trusts that did not reach the level of
“charitable purpose” have been invalidated on that basis. For example, in
Shenendoah Valley National Bank v. Taylor, 420 the testator’s will set up
a perpetual trust to pay the income to local schoolchildren on the last day
of school before Easter and before Christmas, “to be used by such child
in the furtherance of his or her obtainment of an education.” The court
invalidated the trust because, although there was a direction that the
414. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a.
415. See id. § 47 cmt. e; II SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 187, § 124.7.
416. See Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wash. 2d 366, 907 P.2d 290 (1995).
417. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010 (2012).
418. See Stocker v. Stocker, 74 Wash. App. 1, 871 P.2d 1095 (1994); Moe v. Brumfield, 27
Wash. 2d 714, 179 P.2d 968 (1947).
419. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28, 44.
420. 63 S.E.2d 786 (Va. 1951).
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children use the funds for educational purposes, the timing of the
distributions made that unlikely. The purpose of the so-called “candy
trust” was therefore benevolent but not charitable and, as a private trust,
violated the rule against perpetuities.
The most famous example of such a trust is George Bernard Shaw’s
alphabet trust. He left his estate in trust “to use one-third of the income
for thirty years, or until the trust sooner terminates, to support (a) the
study of the advantages of a phonetic alphabet and (b) the publication
and free distribution of my play, ‘Andrew and the Leopard,’ written in
this alphabet.” 421 His heirs challenged the trust because the purpose was
not charitable, and the suit was settled, funding the alphabet trust project
with a fraction of what Shaw intended. 422 Both of these trusts, and trusts
with similar benevolent but noncharitable purposes, 423 can now be
established for a period of 150 years under Washington law. 424 The
statute provides for a person designated in the trust, or by the court, to
enforce the trust, and that person is considered a qualified beneficiary of
the trust and entitled to notice under RCW 11.98. 425 The purpose of the
trust must be “valid” so a trust could still be challenged on ground that
the purpose is contrary to public policy or otherwise invalid. 426
4.

Cy Pres

RCW 11.96A.127, based on UTC section 405, codifies but also
modifies the doctrine of cy pres. The Washington statute applies to
charitable dispositions in wills as well as trusts. The common law
doctrine requires finding both that the stated charitable purpose is
impossible and impracticable and that the donor had a general charitable
intent in order for the court to have power to amend the terms of the
charitable gift. The statute eliminates the required finding of general
charitable intent and instead presumes that such charitable intent existed.
Elimination of the general charitable intent requirement overrules the

421. In re Shaw, 1 All E.R. 745 (Ch. 1957); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 illus.7.
422. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS TRUSTS & ESTATES 759–60 (8th ed. 2009).
423. Another example of a noncharitable trust, which was considered by the Task Force, would
be a reward fund set up, offering a reward for information about a crime, that would last for a
certain period.
424. The Washington statute differs from the UTC in allowing the trust to last 150 years, our
perpetuities period per RCW 11.98.130, rather than twenty-one years.
425. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.015 (West 2013); see also S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg.
Sess. § 16 (Wash. 2013) (requiring notice be given to qualified beneficiaries).
426. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.013 (2012).
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holding in Horton v. Board of Education, 427 that a gift to a specific
charitable institution, without a specified use for the gifted funds, is not
eligible for cy pres. In Horton, Dexter Horton’s will established a trust
for his granddaughter with the remainder payable to the Kansas City
University. During the granddaughter’s life, the University was
dissolved and the assets sold to another university. The court held that
the University’s interest was a contingent remainder, and lapsed because
the University was no longer in existence. 428 The successor university
argued application of cy pres, but the Washington State Supreme Court
agreed with the trial court judge, who stated:
Now, his primary thought at that time was not any institution,
was not any charitable affair at all. It was his daughter. But he
realized that if there was anything left over, then this particular
Methodist college of which he was well aware, which he knew
about and which he was interested in, then as to whatever that
amount be, maybe nothing, maybe something, maybe something
great, whatever it is, “That particular college I want to have it.”
It has no reference or no connection, in my humble opinion,
whatever with efforts to any charitable matter at all. It has
strictly to do with a certain designated party, “And I want that
party to have it.” 429
Under the current statute, Dexter Horton’s charitable intent, in
naming a charitable institution, would be presumed. The statute also
provides that if the will or trust makes an alternative gift to a private
individual or creates a reversion to the grantor if the charitable gift fails,
the alternative gift is effective only for twenty-one years after the trust
became irrevocable or the testator died, or in the case of a reversion, the
grantor is still alive. 430
H.

Reformation of Mistakes

This section was a major departure from former Washington law,
which followed the common law rule that does not allow the correction

427. 32 Wash. 2d 99, 201 P.2d 163 (1949).
428. This is a questionable holding. The interest was contingent only on the fund being exhausted
by the granddaughter’s needs and there was no requirement in the document that the university
survive to the end of the granddaughter’s life estate.
429. Horton, 32 Wash. 2d at 106–07, 201 P.2d at 167.
430. WASH. REV. CODE §11.98A.127(2). See generally Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?:
The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
41 (1989).
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of mistakes in wills and restricts modification of irrevocable trusts.431
The section is based on UTC section 415 but differs in two key respects.
First, RCW 11.96A.125 applies to reformation of both trusts and
wills. 432 Second, the statute allows reformation both by judicial decision,
if a mistake is proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and by
binding nonjudicial agreement. 433 The statute was amended in 2013 to
clarify that the parties are free to reform the agreement provided the
requirements of RCW 11.96A.220 are met, without findings of clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence of the mistake. 434
I.

Default and Mandatory Rules

Section 105 of the UTC states the general rule that the statutory rules
are default rules that can be overridden by the trust agreement, with
some critical exceptions. This rule was already in the Washington statute
in RCW 11.97.010 but was amended to clarify the exceptions. Under the
current statute, there are several issues that either cannot be overridden
by the trust agreement or are subject to limitations:
(1) A trustee cannot be relieved of the duty to act in good faith and
with honest judgment;
(2) The duty to keep beneficiaries informed can be limited only as
provided in the revised notice provisions of RCW 11.98; 435
(3) The definitions of “qualified beneficiaries” and “permissible
distributees” cannot be altered;
(4) Mandatory rules that cannot be waived by the trust agreement
including spendthrift protection for a beneficiary’s interest in a
trust (other than a self-settled trust) (RCW 6.32.250); and access

431. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c
(2003); Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century, 35 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697 (2001); Edward C. Halback, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Other
Trends in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 25 ACTEC L.J. 101 (1999).
432. The UTC does not apply to wills generally, and there is a corresponding provision in the
Uniform Probate Code allowing reformation of mistakes in wills. See UNIF. PROBATE. CODE § 2805 (2010).
433. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.220.
434. The drafters’ comments to Senate Bill 5344 state: “This section is modified to clarify that
the evidentiary standard contained in this section only applies to reformations by judicial procedure.
It is long standing law in Washington that reformations may be made by agreement under
RCW 11.96A.220 without application of the evidentiary standard.” Comments to 2012 Title 11
Revisions, WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Legal-Community/LegislativeAffairs/~/media/Files/Legal%20Community/Legislative%20Affairs/2013/Trust%20Act.ashx (last
visited Sept. 26, 2013) (WSBA comments to 2013 bill).
435. See supra Part II.D.4 (discussing notice provisions).
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to a beneficiary’s interest in a trust for child support and
necessities of life creditors (RCW 11.96A.190), and creditors of
a beneficiary of a self-settled trust (RCW 19.36.020),
(5) The limitations on a trustee’s exercise of discretion under
RCW 11.98.200 through 11.98.240 can only be changed by
reference to those statutes and the requirements in the statutes
for any deviation from the statutes; and
(6) The interpretation and application of exercises of powers of
appointment in RCW 11.95.100 through 11.95.150 are
mandatory rules that cannot be changed.
J.

Change of Situs

The Washington provisions for change of trust situs were similar to
the UTC provisions, but were updated in the 2011 and 2013 Legislation
to conform to the UTC process because both Task Forces believed that
the UTC model was more efficient. Under previous law, the trustee
could transfer the situs only if the transfer met several criteria: (1) it
would facilitate the economic and convenient administration of the trust;
(2) it would not materially impair the interests of the beneficiaries or
others interested in the trust; (3) it would not violate the terms of the
trust, and (d) it had the consent of all parties. 436 The new standard for
transfer is the same but now adds the requirement that transfer be to a
jurisdiction where one of the “connection” requirements for situs
described above 437 is met with respect to that jurisdiction. 438 The process
for judicial transfer of situs remained unchanged, but nonjudicial transfer
of situs was amended to continue to allow for parties to enter into a
nonjudicial binding agreement, but also to add a nonjudicial process
similar to the UTC. Under the current statute, the trustee must send out
notice to the qualified beneficiaries with a statement that they have sixty
days to object to the proposed transfer. 439 The consent of all
beneficiaries no longer must be obtained. The notice to each party must
include several pieces of information: (1) the contact information for the
trustee; (2) the trust document; (3) a listing of the assets and liabilities of
the trust dated within ninety days; (4) name, address and qualifications
of new trustee, evidence of new trustee’s acceptance, and the name of
the court having jurisdiction; (5) a statement of facts supporting the
436.
437.
438.
439.

See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.045(2) (2010).
See supra notes 239–256 and accompanying text.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.045(2) (2012).
S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15(1) (Wash. 2013).
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mandatory considerations of RCW 11.98.045(2); (6) notice that each
beneficiary has not less than sixty days to object to the transfer; and (7) a
form to consent or object to the transfer. 440 If a beneficiary does not
object in that time period, the trustee can go forward with the transfer of
situs. 441
K.

Venue

The venue provisions were updated in the 2011 Legislation, because
the prior law set venue in the county of the trust’s situs, which was
defined as the principal place of administration, and those terms were
out of date and ambiguous. 442 The new provisions are similar to the
venue determinations for probate in that they allow for venue to be
proper in multiple counties. Generally, any county with a contact with
the trust listed in the situs statute can be selected, and if the trust has
none of those contacts with any county, but Washington otherwise has
jurisdiction, then venue is in any county. 443 Because of the number of
options, the statute now includes a procedure for an interested party to
move venue, similar to the procedure in the probate section. 444 A party is
always able to request a change of venue, but if a party makes the
request within four months of the first notice of a proceeding, then venue
must be moved to the county with the strongest connection to the trust,
except for good cause shown. 445
L.

New Chapter on Revocable Trusts

The Task Force adopted the UTC approach of a separate section of
rules applicable to revocable living trusts, recognizing their increasing
presence as an alternative to will planning. The new chapter, RCW
11.103, codifies and clarifies several issues regarding revocable living
trusts, such as how to amend or revoke, and limitations of actions on the
validity of a revocable living trust. RCW 11.103.020 is taken from UTC
section 601 and clarifies that the capacity required to create or exercise
powers with regard to a revocable trust is the same as that required to
make a will. This provision is in recognition of the role of revocable

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.98.051(1) (West 2013).
Id. § 11.98.051(2).
See supra Part III, Determination of Trust Situs.
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.96A.050(1) (2012).
Id. § 11.96A.050(4).
Id.
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living trusts as will substitutes and part of the movement to make the
laws applicable to wills and to revocable living trusts consistent.446
There was some concern expressed that this section created the
possibility that if a trustor of a revocable trust became incapacitated, the
trustor would lose the ability to revoke or amend under this section and
therefore the trust would become irrevocable, triggering a taxable gift.
That concern is unfounded. The possibility would have existed
independent of a statute specifying the level of capacity required to
amend or revoke (for example, if the trustor were in a coma and clearly
unable to amend or revoke under any standard of capacity), and the
authors know of no reported decisions in which that argument was
raised. Second, even if the trustor were incapacitated, the trust remains
revocable by an attorney-in-fact (if in existence and so authorized), or by
a guardian. 447 And the legal assumption is that the trustor, if alive, can
always “get better.” 448
RCW 11.103.030 covers revocation and amendment of revocable
trusts and is based on section 602 of the UTC. First, the 2003 Task Force
chose to retain the common law presumption that a trust was irrevocable
unless expressly stated otherwise, rather than adopting the UTC rule that
trusts were presumptively revocable. The section contains specific
provisions concerning community property. Either spouse may revoke
the trust unilaterally as to community property in the trust, but both must
join in any amendment. 449 If there is noncommunity property in a trust
with multiple trustors, a trustor can revoke or amend with respect to his
or her separately contributed property, but the trustee must notify the
other trustors of any such changes. The Washington statute includes a
statement that “[t]he character of community property or separate
property is unaffected by its transfer to and from a revocable trust.” 450
The method of revocation and amendment is now specified in the
statute. Substantial compliance with the method of revocation or
amendment provided in the trust agreement is sufficient. If there is no
method provided in the trust agreement, the trustor can revoke or amend
by a “later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically
devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the
446. See John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in Wills, 18 PROB. &
PROP. 28, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 30.
447. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.140.
448. MONTY PYTHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Python (Monty) Pictures 1975), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UTdDN_MRe64.
449. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.103.030(2)(a).
450. Id. § 11.103.030(2)(c).
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terms of the trust;” or a “written instrument signed by the trustor
evidencing intent to revoke or amend.” 451
The Washington statute differs from the UTC in several ways. First, it
requires a writing to amend or revoke if no other method was specified
in the trust agreement; 452 second, it clarifies that the superwill provisions
of RCW 11.11 do not apply to the trustor’s ability to amend or revoke
with the methods specified in this section. The section further specifies
that an attorney in fact can exercise the trustor’s powers to amend or
revoke only to the extent authorized by the power of attorney 453 and as
authorized, or as consistent with the terms of the trust agreement. This
wording is slightly different than UTC section 602, and requires both
authorization in the power of attorney, and either authorization in the
trust agreement or a showing that such exercise by the attorney in fact is
consistent with the trust agreement. A guardian may exercise a trustor’s
powers to amend or revoke only with court approval under RCW
11.92.140. Finally, the section protects a trustee who acts without
knowledge that the trust has been revoked or amended.
RCW 11.103.040 is based on UTC section 603, and clarifies that
while a trustor of a revocable trust is alive, the trustee owes duties only
to the trustor. The Washington provision varies from the UTC because
the UTC states that the sole duty to the trustee lasts as long as the trust is
revocable and the trustor has capacity. RCW 11.103.050 now provides a
contest period similar to that available for will contests. 454 If a trustee
has given notice as required under RCW 11.98.07, once the trustor has
died, the beneficiary has four months to contest the validity of the trust.
If no such notice is given, the validity of the trust can be contested
within twenty-four months of the trustor’s death. 455
M.

Accepting and Declining Trusteeship

The 2003 Task Force did not add UTC section 701, “Accepting or
Declining Trusteeship,” because it did not believe it was necessary.
However, since several provisions of RCW Chapter 11.98 rely on the
timing of the acceptance of the trusteeship, the 2012 Task Force decided

451. Id. § 11.103.030(3)(b).
452. The UTC provision allows amendment or revocation by “any other method manifesting
clear and convincing evidence of the settlor’s intent.” U.T.C. § 602(c)(2)(B) (2010).
453. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.94.050.
454. Id. § 11.24.010.
455. This time period is consistent with the claims period for creditors when no notice to creditors
has been giving. Id. § 11.40.010.
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it would be a helpful addition for the sake of clarity. The section on
accepting trusteeship is identical to the UTC. 456 But to decline
trusteeship, the Washington statute requires that the person deliver a
written declination to the trustor or the successor trustee or to a qualified
beneficiary. 457 By contrast, the UTC does not specify a method of
declining trusteeship, and provides that a person who has not accepted
the trusteeship within a reasonable time is deemed to have declined.458
Under the Washington statute, acceptance and declination both require
affirmative acts. Both the Washington statute and the UTC provide that a
person can act to preserve the property or investigate the property
without having to actually accept the trusteeship. 459
N.

Trustee Powers

RCW 11.98.070 lists the powers held by trustees unless otherwise
provided in the trust agreement. The 2003 Task Force compared
Washington’s existing list of powers with UTC section 816 and selected
some enumerated powers from the UTC section to include in the
Washington statute. The Task force believed that these added powers
were most likely within a trustee’s authority under current law but that it
would be beneficial to include specific reference to them in the statute.
One substantive change was the provision on payments to minors and
other incapacitated beneficiaries. 460 The revised section expands the
trustee’s options for payment and now specifies that if the trustee uses
one of the prescribed methods, “the trustee has no further obligations
regarding the amounts so paid.” 461
O.

Plan of Distribution Upon Termination of Trust

The 2011 Legislation added RCW 11.98.145, which is taken from
UTC section 817. It allows a trustee to propose a plan of distribution of
trust assets to beneficiaries upon termination of the trust, and authorizes
the trustee to follow that plan as long as no beneficiary objects within
thirty days. Note that the notice of the plan, if mailed, must be by
certified mail, in contrast to other forms of notice required in RCW Title

456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.

S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 10(1) (Wash. 2013); U.T.C. § 701(a).
S.B. 5344 § 10(2).
U.T.C. § 701(b).
S.B. 5344 § 10(3); U.T.C. § 701(c).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.070(16).
Id. § 11.98.070(16)(b).
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11 that can be sent by regular mail. 462
P.

Nonliability of Third Persons Without Knowledge of Breach

RCW 11.98.105 was added in the 2011 Legislation, and is based on
UTC section 1012. It is a clarification and codification of common law.
Under this section, a third person dealing with a trustee in good faith and
without knowledge that the trustee is acting improperly is protected from
liability. There are two important provisions that give specific
clarification. First, the third person acting in good faith does not have a
duty to inquire into the trustee’s authority. Second, a third party who
turns property over to a trustee does not have a duty to ensure that the
trustee subsequently applies the property appropriately. 463 Because the
section is essentially identical to UTC section 1012, the UTC comments
and interpretations from other states with this section should be helpful
in defining the scope of the liability protection under this statute. Former
section 11.98.090 covered the same subject, without the same level of
detail, and was repealed in the 2013 Legislation. 464
Q.

Exculpatory Clauses

RCW 11.98.107 was added in the 2011 Legislation and is based on
UTC section 1008. It provides that clauses that relieve the trustee from
liability for breach of duty are unenforceable if inserted as a result of
abuse of the relationship between the trustor and the trustee. 465 It further
provides that an exculpatory clause drafted or caused to be drafted by the
trustee is presumed invalid unless the trustee proves that the clause is
fair, and that it was adequately explained to the trustor. 466 The burden
therefore shifts to the trustee to prove an exculpatory clause is
enforceable in situations where the trustee caused the term to be
included. Drafters of trusts should therefore document fairness and
disclosure to the trustor when an exculpatory clause is requested by the
trustee. The 2003 Task Force elected not to include the UTC language
regarding the unwaivability of good faith, because that requirement is
already codified at RCW 11.97.010.

462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. § 11.96A.110.
Id. § 11.98.105(2)–(3).
S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 18 (Wash. 2013).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.107(1).
Id. § 11.98.107(2).
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Beneficiary Consent, Release, or Ratification

RCW 11.98.108 is taken from UTC section 1009 and codifies
common law that a beneficiary can waive, release, or ratify a trustee’s
action that may otherwise be considered a breach of trust, and such
waiver, release, or ratification is effective unless the beneficiary’s action
was either induced by the trustee’s improper conduct or the beneficiary
was not properly informed.
S.

Certification of Trust

RCW 11.98.075 is taken from UTC section 1013, and is an important
addition to existing law. It authorizes a trustee to respond to a request
from a third party, such as a bank, for the trust agreement by delivering
instead a certificate with certain pertinent information, but without the
dispositive terms of the trust. With this provision, trustees who are asked
by third parties for copies of the trust agreement can protect the privacy
of the trustor and beneficiaries by giving instead a certificate that gives
the third party only the information necessary to do business with the
trust. If a third party nevertheless demands a copy of the entire trust
agreement in addition to the certification, and that demand is not in good
faith, that third party can be held liable for damages, including attorneys’
fees incurred to resist such a request. 467 The section protects third parties
who rely in good faith on the certificate, and the damages and attorneys’
fees provision deters a third party from insisting on the trust agreement
in addition to the certification. 468
T.

Damages for Breach of Trust

RCW 11.98.085 specifies calculation of damages when a trustee
breaches his fiduciary duties, and is identical to UTC section 1002. It
codifies the common law that a trustee is liable for the greater of the
amount necessary to restore the trust to its value if no breach occurred,
and the profit made by the trustee. 469 The section also provides for a
method of contribution if there are multiple trustees liable to the
beneficiaries. 470

467.
468.
469.
470.

Id. § 11.98.075(8).
Id. § 11.98.075(6)–(8).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2012).
WASH. REV. CODE § 11.98.085(2).
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Effective Dates

Both the 2011 Legislation and the 2013 Legislation state that the
provisions apply to trusts in existence at the effective dates of the acts as
well as to trusts to be created, and apply to pending as well as future
judicial proceedings, unless the court finds that such application would
interfere with the proceedings or prejudice the rights of the parties. 471
These sections are based on UTC section 1106. The comments to that
UTC section state:
By applying the Code to preexisting trusts, the need to know two
bodies of law will quickly lessen. This Code cannot be fully
retroactive, however. Constitutional limitations preclude
retroactive application of rules of construction to alter property
rights under trusts that became irrevocable prior to the effective
date. Also, rights already barred by a statute of limitation or rule
under former law are not revived by a possibly longer statute or
more liberal rule under this Code. Nor is an act done before the
effective date of the Code affected by the Code’s enactment. 472
However, both the 2011 Legislation and the 2013 Legislation make
an exception for the sixty-day notice to beneficiaries requirement. 473

471. S.B. 5344, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 28 (Wash. 2013); H.B. 1051, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40
(Wash. 2011).
472. U.T.C. § 1106 cmt. (2010).
473. See supra notes 167–171 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
This proposed revision to RCW 11.96A.120 attempts to address the
concerns raised in Part IV.D of this Article.
RCW 11.96A.120 - Representation
(1) Notice to a person who may represent and bind another person under
this section has the same effect as if notice were given directly to the
other person.
(2) The consent of a person who may represent and bind another person
under this section is binding on the person represented unless the
person represented objects to the representation before the consent
would otherwise have become effective.
(3) The following limitations on the ability to serve as a representative
shall apply:
(a) a trustor may not represent and bind a beneficiary under this
section with respect to the termination and modification of an
irrevocable trust; and
(b) representation of an incapacitated trustor with respect to his or
her powers over a trust shall be subject to the provisions of
RCW 11.103.030, and chapters 11.96A, 11.88 and 11.92 RCW;
and
(c) the representative and the person represented must not have a
conflict of interest at any time during the representation with
respect to the particular matter that is the subject of the
representation.
(4) To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the
representative and the person represented or among those being
represented with respect to the particular question or dispute The
following fiduciary representation is permissible:
(a) a guardian may represent and bind the estate that the guardian
controls, subject to chapters 11.96A, 11.88 and 11.92 RCW;
(b) a guardian of the person may represent and bind the
incapacitated person if a guardian of the incapacitated person’s
estate has not been appointed;
(c) an agent having authority to act with respect to the particular
question or dispute may represent and bind the principal;
(d) a trustee may represent and bind the beneficiaries of the trust;
and
(e) a personal representative of a decedent’s estate may represent
and bind persons interested in the estate.
(5) A parent may represent and bind the parent’s minor or unborn child
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or children if a guardian for the child or children has not been
appointed.
(6) Unless otherwise represented, a minor, incapacitated, or unborn
individual, or a person whose identity or location is unknown and
not reasonably ascertainable, may be represented by another having
a substantially identical interest with regard to the particular
question or dispute matter that is the subject of the representation,
but only to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the
representative and the person represented with regard to the
particular question or dispute.
(7) Where an interest has been given to a class of persons, the living
members of the class as of the date that the representation is to be
determined, may virtually represent and bind all other members of
the class as of that date, but only to the extent that there is no
conflict of interest between the representative and the person(s)
represented with regard to the particular question or dispute.
(8) Representation of successive interests is permitted as follows:
(a) Where an interest has been given to a living person or to a class
of persons and a substantially identical interest is to pass to
another person or class of persons, or both, upon the happening
of a future event, the living person, or the living members of the
class of persons, who hold the interest may represent and bind
all of the persons and classes of persons who might take on the
happening of all subsequent future events.
(b) Where an interest will be given to a living person or to a class of
persons upon the happening of a future event and a substantially
identical interest would pass to another person or class of
persons, or both, upon the happening of one or more subsequent
future events, the living person, or the living members of the
class of persons, who will hold the interest on the happening of
an earlier event may represent and bind all of the persons and
classes of persons who might take on the happening of all
subsequent future events.
Where an interest has been given to a living person, and the same
interest, or a share in it, is to pass to the surviving spouse or
surviving domestic partner or to persons who are, or might be, the
heirs, issue, or other kindred of that living person or the distributes
of the estate of that living person upon the happening of a future
event, that living person may virtually represent the surviving
spouse or surviving domestic partner, heirs, issue, or other kindred
of the person, and the distributes of the estate of the person, but only
to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the
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representative and the person(s) represented with regard to the
particular question or dispute.
(8) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7), where an interest has
been given to a person or a class of persons, or both, upon the
happening of any future event, and the same interest or a share of the
interest is to pass to another person or class of persons, or both, upon
the happening of an additional future event, the living person or
persons who would take the interest upon the happening of the first
event may virtually represent the persons and classes of persons who
might take on the happening of the additional future event, but only
to the extent there is no conflict of interest between the
representative and the person(s) represented with regard to the
particular question or dispute.
(9) To the extent there is no conflict of interest between the holder of
the power of appointment and the persons represented with respect
to the particular question or dispute,
(c) The holder of a lifetime or testamentary power of appointment
may virtually represent and bind persons who are permissible
appointees or takers in default (but only to the extent that they
the takers in default are permissible appointees in the case of a
limited power of appointment) under the power, and who are not
permissible distributees.
(9) (10) The Attorney General may virtually represent and bind a
charitable organization if:
(a) the charitable organization is not a qualified beneficiary
specified in the trust instrument or acting as Trustee; or
(b) the charitable organization is a qualified beneficiary, but is not a
permissible distributee, and its beneficial interest in the trust is
subject to change by the trustor or by a person designated by the
trustor.
(10) (11) An action taken by the court is conclusive and binding upon
each person receiving actual or constructive notice or who is
otherwise represented under this section.
(11) (12) This section is intended to adopt and expand on the common
law concept of virtual representation. This section supplements the
common law relating to the doctrine of virtual representation and
shall not be construed as limiting the application of that common
law doctrine.

